The Supreme Court’s “Criminal” Daubert Cases
Paul C. Giannelli

*

I. INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................1072
II. DAUBERT’S TRANSFORMATION .......................................................1077
A.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc.
B.
General Electric Co. v. Joiner
C.
Kumho Tires Co. v. Carmichael
III. SUPREME COURT’S CRIMINAL “DAUBERT” CASES .........................1083
A.
Delaware v. Fensterer
B.
Arizona v. Youngblood
C.
Barefoot v. Estelle
D.
United States v. Scheffer
E.
Ake v. Oklahoma
IV. DAUBERT’S EFFECT IN CRIMINAL CASES ........................................1096
A.
Reexamination of “Venerable” Techniques
B.
Closing the Frye Loophole
C.
Effect on Frye Test
D.
Effect on Relevancy Approach
E.
The “Third-prong” Controversy: Daubert “Plus”
V. OTHER INFLUENTIAL FACTORS......................................................1106
A.
DNA Evidence
B.
Scientific Abuse Cases
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................1108
VII. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................1111

*

Weatherhead Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. J.D., 1970,
LL.M., 1975, University of Virginia; M.S. in Forensic Science, 1973, George
Washington University.

1071

1072

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33:1071

To put the point more bluntly: if the state does not test the
scientific evidence with which it seeks to convict defendants, it
1
should forfeit the right to use it.

I. INTRODUCTION
In the process of establishing a new standard for determining
the admissibility of scientific evidence under Federal Rule 702, the
2
Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc. handed
down what is perhaps the most important evidence case ever
3
4
decided. The Court followed with General Electric Co. v. Joiner and
5
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael to make up what is now known as the
Daubert trilogy.
One unexpected development has been Daubert’s disparate
impact in civil and criminal cases. The notion that expert testimony
in criminal and civil cases should be treated differently does not
seem, at least to me, to be a remarkable proposition. The issues are
very different.
Instead of worrying about the “hired gun”
6
phenomenon as in civil litigation, the criminal defense lawyer often
7
lacks money for any “gun.” Moreover, the causation issues that loom
so large in toxic tort cases are seldom an issue in criminal
8
prosecutions, and the termination of the litigation before trial

1

MIKE REDMAYNE, EXPERT EVIDENCE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 139 (2001).
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
3
See United States v. Alatorre, 222 F.3d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Daubert has
become ubiquitous in federal trial courts.”); see also United States v. Barnette, 211
F.3d 803, 815 (4th Cir. 2000) (“In Daubert, the Supreme Court radically changed the
standard for admissibility of scientific testimony.”).
4
522 U.S. 136 (1997).
5
526 U.S. 137 (1999).
6
See In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986)
(“[E]xperts whose opinions are available to the highest bidder have no place
testifying in a court of law.”); see also Chaulk v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 808 F.2d 639,
644 (7th Cir. 1986) (“There is hardly anything, not palpably absurd on its face, that
cannot now be proved by some so-called ‘experts.’”). For an insightful discussion of
the “hired gun” problem, see Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV.
1113.
7
See Peter J. Neufeld & Neville Colman, When Science Takes the Witness Stand, 262
SCI. AM. 46, 50 (1990) (“In DNA cases in Oklahoma and Alabama, . . . the defense
did not retain any experts, because the presiding judge had refused to authorize
funds.”). See generally 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE §§ 4-1 to 4-5(3d ed. 1999) (discussing the right to defense experts).
8
Causation is an issue with some crimes, such as homicide, and sometimes the
medical cause of death is an issue—for example, in a “shaken baby” syndrome case.
See People v. Cauley, 32 P.3d 602 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).
2
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9

through summary judgment is not a concern.
What is remarkable about the civil-criminal dichotomy is that
civil litigants have far greater discovery rights than criminal
practitioners even though it is well accepted that pretrial disclosure is
10
critical.
Not only are discovery depositions and interrogatories
unavailable, but a defendant in a death penalty case involving DNA
11
can be precluded from seeing an expert’s lab notes before trial.
What is also remarkable is that stricter admissibility standards
12
would apply in civil cases than in criminal cases. It is difficult to
imagine a federal court in a toxic tort case that would allow a
plaintiff’s attorney to admit evidence that passed for “science” in a
13
recent fingerprint case. In United States v. Havvard, the court
accepted testimony by a FBI expert that: (1) there is a “zero error”
14
rate in fingerprint examinations, (2) peer review under Daubert
15
means a second examiner looks at the prints, and (3) adversarial
9

See LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, RAND INST. OF CIV. JUSTICE, CHANGES IN THE
STANDARDS OF ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE DAUBERT
DECISION xvi (2002) (“Challenges also increasingly resulted in summary judgment.”).
10
The ABA Standards note that the “need for full and fair disclosure is especially
apparent with respect to scientific proof and the testimony of experts. This sort of
evidence is practically impossible for the adversary to test or rebut at trial without an
advance opportunity to examine it closely.” Commentary, ABA STANDARDS RELATING
TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL 66 (Approved Draft 1970); see also Paul
C. Giannelli, Criminal Discovery, Scientific Evidence, and DNA, 44 VAND. L. REV. 791
(1991).
11
Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 785, 791 (Va. 1989); see also Murderer Put
to Death in Virginia: First U.S. Execution Based on DNA Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1994,
at A19 (reporting Spencer’s execution).
12
As one commentator has noted, “the heightened standards of dependability
imposed on expertise proffered in civil cases has continued to expand, but . . .
expertise proffered by the prosecution in criminal cases has been largely insulated
from any change in pre-Daubert standards or approach.” D. Michael Risinger,
Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64
ALB. L. REV. 99 (2000). This issue is not new. The first Bush Administration, by
executive order, imposed high standards for the admissibility of expert testimony in
civil cases, while federal prosecutors were permitted to argue for lower standards in
DNA cases. See Paul C. Giannelli, “Junk Science”: The Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 105 (1993).
13
117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 855 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (stating that fingerprint
identification satisfies standards announced in Daubert and Kumho; the court
described this expertise as “the very archetype of reliable expert testimony under
those standards”), aff’d, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001).
14
Id. at 854 (“The government claims the error rate for the method is zero.”).
There is an important distinction between not knowing the error rate because
systematic testing has not been conducted and a zero error rate.
15
The court noted that a second qualified fingerprint examiner verified the
conclusion and thus there was “review” by a “peer.” Id. at 854 (“In fact, peer review is
the standard operating procedure among latent print examiners.”). In contrast,
peer review under Daubert means the publication of data in “refereed scientific
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16

testing is the equivalent of scientific testing. How can federal courts
17
demand stringent epidemiological studies in toxic tort cases and
then accept such vacuous reasoning in criminal cases?
Other examples are not hard to find. Many of the wrongful
conviction cases involved hair comparison evidence. In Williamson v.
18
Reynolds, a district court correctly noted that the hair expert’s
19
testimony lacked any scientific support.
Nevertheless, the Tenth
20
Circuit reversed on this issue. Williamson was later exonerated by
DNA profiling, and the hair evidence was shown to be “patently
journals.” It is a screening mechanism and only the first step, followed by
publication and then replication by other scientists. “‘Good science’ is a commonly
accepted term used to describe the scientific community’s system of quality control
which protects the community and those who rely upon it from unsubstantiated
scientific analysis. It mandates that each proposition undergo a rigorous trilogy of
publication, replication and verification before it is relied upon.” Brief of Amicus
Curiae New England Journal of Medicine et al. at 2, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (No. 92-102) (supporting Merrell Dow).
16
Havvard found that latent print identification had been “tested” for nearly 100
years in adversarial proceedings with the highest possible stakes. In contrast, DaubertKumho requires scientific testing. The Daubert Court wrote:
[I]n order to qualify as “scientific knowledge,” an inference or
assertion must be derived by the scientific method.
Proposed
testimony must be supported by appropriate validation—i.e., “good
grounds,” based on what is known. In short, the requirement that an
expert’s testimony pertain to “scientific knowledge” establishes a
standard of evidentiary reliability.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. General Electric Co. v. Joiner illustrates this point. That case
involved a toxic tort issue—whether PCB’s caused small cell lung cancer. The
Supreme Court examined epidemiological and animal studies in upholding the trial
court’s decision to exclude expert testimony. See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 153-54.
17
See Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir. 2002) (“The
district court, after finding that the plaintiffs’ evidence was unreliable, noted that
certain types of other evidence may have been considered reliable, including peerreviewed epidemiological literature, a predictable chemical mechanism, general
acceptance in learned treatises, or a very large number of case reports.”); see also
Jerome P. Kassierer & Joe S. Cecil, Inconsistency in Evidentiary Standards for Medical
Testimony: Disorder in the Courts, 288 JAMA 1382, 1382 (2002) (“In some instances,
judges have excluded medical testimony on cause-and-effect relationships unless it is
based on published, peer-reviewed, epidemiologically sound studies, even though
practitioners rely on other evidence of causality in making clinical decisions, when
such studies are not available.”).
18
904 F. Supp. 1529, 1554 (E.D. Okla. 1995), rev’d on this issue, 110 F.3d 1508,
1523 (10th Cir. 1997).
19
The district court had “been unsuccessful in its attempts to locate any
indication that expert hair comparison testimony meets any of the requirements of
Daubert.” Williamson, 904 F. Supp. at 1558. The court further observed: “Although
the hair expert may have followed procedures accepted in the community of hair
experts, the human hair comparison results in this case were, nonetheless,
scientifically unreliable.” Id.
20
110 F.3d 1508, 1523 (10th Cir. 1997) (ruling that the due process, not Daubert,
standard applies in habeas proceedings).
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22

unreliable.” In Coleman v. Commonwealth, another expert testified
that the chances that a crime scene hair sample could come from
23
someone other than the defendant was “possible, but unlikely.”
Once again, this statement lacks any empirical basis. After Coleman’s
24
execution, serious questions concerning his guilt were raised. The
same hair expert testified in the same manner at Edward Honeker’s
25
trial, and Honeker was later exonerated by DNA. Despite all this,
26
later cases continued to admit this suspect evidence. Indeed, one
27
court judicially noticed the reliability of hair evidence, implicitly
28
There is an embarrassing lack of
finding this fact indisputable.
29
empirical validation for this “well-accepted” technique. In a recent
21

BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 146 (2000).
22
307 S.E.2d 864 (Va. 1983).
23
See JOHN TUCKER, MAY GOD HAVE MERCY: A TRUE STORY OF CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT 51 (1997).
24
See id. at 75. The trial judge was later interviewed about the case:
Years later, in response to the author’s question about what evidence in
the case he thought had the most powerful impact on the jury, Judge
Persin said it was Elmer Gist’s testimony about the comparison of the
pubic hairs. It was, Judge Persin observed, the first and only testimony
that seemed to tie Roger Coleman to the murder.
Id.; see also Coleman, 307 S.E.2d at 867; Stuart Taylor, Jr., Was An Innocent Man
Executed?, AM. LAW., Dec. 1997, at 40 (“I’d put the odds that Coleman was innocent
somewhere above fifty-fifty.”; “The state’s hair evidence was shown (after the trial) to
be far from probative and far from reliable.”). The Virginia Supreme Court has
refused to grant media requests for new DNA tests on evidence from Coleman’s trial.
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, 570 S.E.2d 809, 813 (Va. 2002). The
Boston Globe, Washington Post, Richmond Times-Dispatch, The Virginian-Pilot, and
Centurion Ministries—a charitable organization that investigates wrongful conviction
claims—filed a claim asking that biological evidence in the case be analyzed with
modern DNA techniques.
25
See EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE
STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 65
(1996).
26
E.g., State v. Fukusaku, 946 P.2d 32, 44 (Haw. 1997) (“Because the scientific
principles and procedures underlying hair and fiber evidence are well-established
and of proven reliability, the evidence in the present case can be treated as ‘technical
knowledge.’ Thus, an independent reliability determination was unnecessary.”);
McGrew v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1289, 1292 (Ind. 1997) (observing that hair comparison
is more a matter of observation by persons with specialized knowledge than a matter
of scientific principles); McCarty v. State, 904 P.2d 110, 125 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995)
(admitting hair evidence).
27
See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 258, 262 (Ky. 1999).
28
See FED. R. EVID. 201(b) (limiting judicial notice to facts that are not subject to
reasonable dispute); see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 n.11 (“[T]heories that are so
firmly established as to have attained the status of scientific law, such as the laws of
thermodynamics, properly are subject to judicial notice under Fed. Rule Evid. 201.”).
29
See Paul C. Giannelli & Emmie West, Hair Comparison Evidence, 37 CRIM. L.
BULL. 514 (2001) (discussing the DNA exoneration cases in which hair evidence was
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FBI study comparing the results of microscopic hair examinations
and mitochondrial DNA analysis, the former were wrong 10% of the
time—and this was when the conclusion was limited to an
30
“association” (“consistent with” testimony).
Daubert is now a decade old, and its development and impact is
the subject of this symposium. Part II of this article examines the
transformation of Daubert from a case that most courts and
commentators believed lowered the barriers to the admissibility of
scientific evidence to one that a decade later the Court itself would
31
describe as establishing an “exacting” standard. Part III reviews
what I call the Supreme Court’s “criminal” Daubert cases. Although
the Daubert trilogy all involve civil litigation, the Court decided several
cases, both before and after Daubert, that involved expert testimony in
criminal litigation. All these cases involved constitutional issues and
hence are not directly comparable to Daubert, which involved the
32
interpretation of a federal statute. Moreover, these cases all turn on
33
different constitutional rights: cruel and unusual punishment, the
34
35
right of confrontation, the right to preserve defense evidence, and
36
the right to present a defense. Nevertheless, all involved the use of
expert testimony, and all raised reliability issues in one form or
another, and in this respect they share a common theme with Daubert.
One additional point: the defendant lost in each case, and I will
argue that in each the Court missed an important opportunity to
impose the kind of “exacting” standards in criminal prosecutions that
37
are now required in civil litigation.
used to convict the innocent); see also Clive A. Smith & Patrick A. Goodman, Forensic
Hair Comparison Analysis: Nineteenth Century Science or Twentieth Century Snake Oil?, 27
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 227, 231 (1996) (“If the purveyors of this dubious science
cannot do a better job of validating hair analysis than they have done so far, forensic
hair comparison analysis should be excluded altogether from criminal trials.”).
30
Max M. Houch & Bruce Budowle, Correlation of Microscopic and Mitochondrial
DNA Hair Comparisons, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 964, 966 (2002) (“Of the 80 hairs that were
microscopically associated, nine comparisons were excluded by mtDNA analysis.”).
31
Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000).
32
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587 (“We interpret the legislatively enacted Federal Rules
of Evidence as we would any statute.”).
33
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983); see infra text accompanying notes 11326.
34
Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985); see infra text accompanying notes 7189.
35
Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988); see infra text accompanying notes
90-112.
36
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998); see infra text accompanying
notes 127-46.
37
Compare DIXON & GILL, supra note 9, at xiii (“The rise that took place in both
the proportion of evidence found unreliable and the proportion of challenged
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Part IV assesses Daubert’s effect in criminal cases. Although its
impact is far less than in civil cases, it is still significant. Moreover,
Daubert was only one of several developments that influenced the use
of expert testimony in criminal prosecutions during the last decade.
As described in Part V, DNA litigation and scientific evidence abuse
cases have also played a part. Part VI sets forth recommendations for
improving forensic science.
II. DAUBERT’S TRANSFORMATION
A. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc.
In many ways, Daubert was a difficult opinion to interpret even at
the time it was handed down. As one commentary observed,
“[a]stonishingly, all parties expressed satisfaction with the Daubert
decision—the lawyers for the plaintiff and defense, and scientists who
38
wrote amicus briefs.” This alone should have raised red flags.
In particular, some initial reviews questioned whether the
opinion provided much guidance. “The catch,” as one commentator
39
observed, “is that no one is exactly sure what the new standard is.” A
central question was whether the Supreme Court intended its new
reliability standard to be more permissive than the Frye “general
40
acceptance” test that it had rejected. There is much language in the
Daubert opinion that pointed in this direction. For example, the
Court commented:
Given the Rules’ permissive backdrop and their inclusion of a
specific rule on expert testimony that does not mention “general
acceptance,” the assertion that the Rules somehow assimilated Frye
is unconvincing. Frye made “general acceptance” the exclusive
test for admitting expert scientific testimony. That austere
standard, absent from, and incompatible with the Federal Rules
41
of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials.

evidence excluded suggests that the standards for admitting evidence have
tightened.”), with Jennifer L. Goscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of
Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339, 364
(2002) (“[T]he Daubert decision did not impact on the admission rates of expert
testimony at either the trial or the appellate levels.”).
38
Kenneth R. Foster et al., Policy Forum: Science and the Toxic Tort, 261 SCIENCE
1509, 1614 (1993); see also Bert Black & John A. Singer, From Frye to Daubert: A New
Test for Scientific Evidence, 1 SHEPARD’S EXPERT & SCI. EVID. Q. 19, 39 (1993) (“Both
plaintiff and defense lawyers have claimed victory in Daubert.”).
39
See David O. Stewart, A New Test: Decision Creates Uncertain Future for Admissibility
of Expert Testimony, 79 A.B.A. J. 48 (1993).
40
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
41
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
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Other passages noted that “[t]he Rule’s basic standard of relevance . .
42
. is a liberal one” and “a rigid ‘general acceptance’ requirement
would be at odds with the ‘liberal thrust’ of the Federal Rules and
their ‘general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to
43
‘opinion’ testimony.”
Not surprisingly, a number of courts construed Daubert as
44
lowering the admissibility bar. In Borawick v. Shay, the Second
Circuit wrote that “by loosening the strictures on scientific evidence
set by Frye, Daubert reinforces the idea that there should be a
45
presumption of admissibility of evidence.” Similarly, in United States
46
v. Bonds, the Sixth Circuit explained “that the DNA testimony easily
meets the more liberal test set out by the Supreme Court in
47
Daubert.” The polygraph cases also underscore this view. In United
48
States v. Posado, the Fifth Circuit stated that “the rationale underlying
this circuit’s per se rule against admitting polygraph evidence did not
49
50
Other circuits followed, and in this altered
survive Daubert.”
51
climate, some district courts admitted polygraph results.
Furthermore, the methodology-conclusion distinction that was
so prominent in Daubert further supported a lax standard of
admissibility. The Court wrote: “The focus, of course, must be solely
on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they
42

Id. at 587.
Id. at 588 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
There is, of course, language in Daubert that points toward a more exacting standard.
See supra note 16 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590). Moreover, there is the
“gatekeeper” language, which also supports a more restrictive view. Daubert, 509 U.S.
at 592-93.
44
68 F.3d 597 (2d Cir. 1995) (repressed memory).
45
Id. at 610.
46
12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993).
47
Id. at 568; see also State v. Doriguzzi, 760 A.2d 336, 341 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2000) (“Although Frye has been replaced in the federal court system in favor of
the more lenient standards of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as set forth in Daubert . . .
in New Jersey, with the exception of toxic tort litigation, Frye remains the standard.”);
Commonwealth v. Crews, 640 A.2d 395, 400 n.2 (Pa. 1994) (“Daubert relaxes,
somewhat, the impediments to admission of novel scientific evidence.”).
48
57 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 1995).
49
Id. at 429.
50
See United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 227-28 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that
its former per se rule of exclusion is inconsistent with Daubert); see also United States v.
Call, 129 F.3d 1402, 1404 (10th Cir. 1997).
51
See United States v. Padilla, 908 F. Supp. 923 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (admitting
polygraph evidence offered by the defense); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 897 F. Supp.
299 (W.D. La. 1995) (admitting polygraph evidence in a civil case); United States v.
Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 1354 (D. Ariz. 1995); United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp.
877 (D.N.M. 1995). See generally Paul C. Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence Post-Daubert, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 895 (1998).
43
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52

generate.” Consequently, the trial judge reviews only the expert’s
53
methods, not the expert’s conclusion.
B. General Electric Co. v. Joiner
54

The Supreme Court’s second case, General Electric Co. v. Joiner,
on first reading, would also seem to support the theme of liberal
admissibility. The Court ruled that the appellate standard for
reviewing a trial court’s admissibility decision under Daubert was an
55
abuse-of-discretion, a standard adopted without even considering
56
The Court’s
the principal alternative standard: de novo review.
standard suggests that admissibility decisions would not be second
guessed on appeal—giving the trial court more leeway in admitting
evidence. In contrast, a de novo review standard would have given
appellate courts more authority to control junk science.
On further inspection, however, several aspects of Joiner caution
against this reading. First, the evidence was excluded, not admitted.
Second, the Court went beyond the question accepted for review and
57
applied the standard without remand to the court of appeals.

52

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595; see also State v. Merwin, 962 P.2d 1026, 1030 (Idaho
1998) (“Even under the holding in Daubert, the focus of the court’s inquiry is ‘on the
principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.’”).
53
See Kenneth J. Cheseboro, Taking Daubert’s “Focus” Seriously: The Methodology/
Conclusion Distinction, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1745 (1994).
54
522 U.S. 136 (1997).
55
Id. at 146-47. The Court wrote:
We hold, therefore, that abuse of discretion is the proper standard by
which to review a district court’s decision to admit or exclude scientific
evidence. We further hold that, because it was within the District
Court’s discretion to conclude that the studies upon which the experts
relied were not sufficient, whether individually or in combination, to
support their conclusions that Joiner’s exposure to PCBs contributed
to his cancer, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding their testimony.
Id.
56
Other courts have taken a different approach to the standard of review issue.
For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Court has stated that “[i]n considering the
issue of scientific validity, our review is de novo because a trial judge’s conclusion will
have applicability beyond the facts of the case before him.” Commonwealth v. Vao
Sok, 683 N.E.2d 671, 677 (Mass. 1997); see also David L. Faigman, Appellate Review of
Scientific Evidence Under Daubert and Joiner, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 969 (1997) (arguing for
de novo review).
57
See Michael H. Gottesman, From Barefoot to Daubert to Joiner: Triple Play or
Double Error?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 766 (1998) (“Had the Court stopped there and
remanded the case as defendants had requested, its decision would have been
uncontroversial. However, although it had already answered the only question
presented, the Court went on to hand the defendants a victory greater than they had
sought.”).
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Interestingly, the Chief Justice, who in his Daubert concurrence,
voiced considerable discomfort with the capability of federal judges
to understand scientific concepts such as “falsifiability” and who was
58
concerned that they would be turned into amateur scientists, had
apparently overcome these fears and revealed no hesitation in
reviewing epidemiological and animal studies in Joiner. Third, the
“methodology-conclusion” dichotomy, so critical in Daubert, was
drawn into question. The Joiner Court remarked that nothing in
Daubert “requires a district court to admit opinion evidence which is
connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court
may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between
59
the data and the opinion proffered.” In other words, the dichotomy
is not as easy to apply as suggested in Daubert. Finally, the Court
commented that “while the Federal Rules of Evidence allow district
courts to admit a somewhat broader range of scientific testimony than
would have been admissible under Frye, they leave in place the
60
‘gatekeeper’ role of the trial judge in screening such evidence.”
The term “somewhat” is riveting. The language in Daubert (quoted
above) suggested that a heck of a lot more evidence would be
admissible under Daubert than under Frye.
In hindsight, at least, Joiner was a transitional case, moving from
a liberal standard of admissibility as suggested in Daubert, to an
61
exacting standard as noted a decade later.
C. Kumho Tires Co. v. Carmichael
62

Kumho Tires Co. v. Carmichael, the third case in the Daubert
63
trilogy, removed any doubts about the Court’s intended direction.
58

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600-01 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice
commented:
I defer to no one in my confidence in federal judges; but I am at a loss
to know what is meant when it is said that the scientific status of a
theory depends on its “falsifiability,” and I suspect some of them will
be, too. I do not doubt that Rule 702 confides to the judge some
gatekeeping responsibility in deciding questions of the admissibility of
proffered expert testimony. But I do not think it imposes on them
either the obligation or the authority to become amateur scientists in
order to perform that role.
Id.
59
522 U.S. at 146.
60
Id. at 142 (emphasis added).
61
See Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000).
62
526 U.S. 137 (1999).
63
At the end of the day, the Court had upheld the exclusion of the proffered
expert testimony in all three cases. In Daubert, the Court remanded. On remand,
the court of appeals again excluded the evidence, and the Supreme Court denied
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First, the Court extended Daubert’s reliability requirement to
64
nonscientific testimony under Rule 702. In the aftermath of Daubert,
litigators quickly understood that they might avoid the Daubert
reliability requirement by simply relabeling their evidence from
“scientific” to “technical.” The Court had to shut this door or
Daubert’s impact would have been restricted to a narrow category of
cases.
Second, the Court acknowledged the relevance of the Daubert
65
factors in determining reliability in this context. In other words,
these factors were not limited to “scientific” evidence; they might
apply to all expert testimony. This may turn out to be the more
critical aspect of the case. Other courts had concluded that the
reliability requirement applied to nonscientific expert testimony but
had adopted extremely lenient standards for such evidence. For
example, the Hawaii Supreme Court had ruled that:
because the underlying scientific principles and procedures are of
proven validity/reliability, it is unnecessary to subject technical
certiorari. 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 869 (1995).
64
The Court concluded that “Daubert’s general holding—setting forth the trial
judge’s general ‘gatekeeping’ obligation—applies not only to testimony based on
‘scientific’ knowledge, but also to testimony based on ‘technical’ and ‘other
specialized’ knowledge.” Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141. To support its conclusion, the
Court noted that: (1) Rule 702 did not distinguish between “scientific” knowledge
and “technical” or “other specialized knowledge”; (2) Daubert’s gatekeeping rationale
was not limited to scientific knowledge; and (3) “it would prove difficult, if not
impossible, for judges to administer evidentiary rules under which a gatekeeping
obligation depended upon a distinction between ‘scientific’ knowledge and
‘technical’ or ‘other specialized’ knowledge.” Id. at 148.
65
In determining the admissibility of technical or other specialized knowledge,
the Court held that the trial court “may consider one or more of the specific factors
that Daubert mentioned when doing so will help determine that testimony’s
reliability.” Id. at 141. The Court characterized the Daubert inquiry as “flexible” and
noted:
[W]e can neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases and for all time the
applicability of the factors mentioned in Daubert, nor can we now do so
for subsets of cases categorized by category of expert or by kind of
evidence. . . . Daubert itself is not to the contrary. It made clear that its
list of factors was meant to be helpful, not definitive. Indeed, those
factors do not all necessarily apply even in every instance in which the
reliability of scientific testimony is challenged. It might not be
surprising in a particular case, for example, that a claim made by a
scientific witness has never been the subject of peer review, for the
particular application at issue may never previously have interested any
scientist. Nor, on the other hand, does the presence of Daubert’s
general acceptance factor help show that an expert’s testimony is
reliable where the discipline itself lacks reliability, as, for example, do
theories grounded in any so-called generally accepted principles of
astrology or necromancy.
Id. at 150-51.
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knowledge to the same type of full-scale reliability determination
required for scientific knowledge. Thus, although technical
knowledge, like all expert testimony, must be both relevant and
66
reliable, its reliability may be presumed.

Although the court ruled that technical expert testimony must be
reliable, it undercut the significance of that ruling by treating
technical evidence as presumptively admissible. The court effectively
shifted the burden of proof on the reliability requirement to the
opposing party. Kumho rejected this approach. Consequently, the
reliability requirement is not only wide but it is deep.
67
The Court confirmed this view in Weisgram v. Marley Co. while
reviewing a summary judgment in a wrongful death action against a
manufacturer of an allegedly defective baseboard heater. Although
expert testimony was involved, the Court was not required to
elaborate further on the Daubert-Kumho standard. Nevertheless, the
Court did remark: “Since Daubert, moreover, parties relying on expert
evidence have had notice of the exacting standards of reliability such
68
evidence must meet.” Here, the “liberal” standard of the Federal
69
Rules has been explicitly replaced by an “exacting” standard. As one
district court observed, the Supreme Court in Daubert and Kumho “is
plainly inviting a reexamination even of ‘generally accepted’
70
venerable, technical fields.”

66

State v. Fukusaku, 946 P.2d 32, 43 (Haw. 1997).
528 U.S. 440 (2000).
68
Id. at 455; see also Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
509 U.S. 209, 242 (1993) (“When an expert opinion is not supported by sufficient
facts to validate it in the eyes of the law, or when indisputable record facts contradict
or otherwise render the opinion unreasonable, it cannot support a jury’s verdict.”).
69
See United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 553 (D. Md. 2002). The court
determined that:
Under Daubert, therefore, it was expected that it would be easier to
admit evidence that was the product of new science or technology. In
practice, however, it often seems as though the opposite has
occurred—application of Daubert/Kumho Tire analysis results in the
exclusion of evidence that might otherwise have been admitted under
Frye.
Id.; see also Kassierer & Cecil, supra note 17, at 1383 (“In the Daubert case . . . the
Supreme Court rejected the deferential standard of the Frye Rule in favor of a more
assertive standard that required courts to determine that expert testimony was well
grounded in the methods and procedures of science.”).
70
United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67 (D. Mass. 1999); see also infra notes
149-60.
67

2003

“CRIMINAL” DAUBERT CASES

1083

III. SUPREME COURT’S CRIMINAL “DAUBERT” CASES
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court decided a number of
criminal procedure cases dealing with expert evidence between 1983
and 2000. Although these cases all involved constitutional issues, I
argue that reliability concerns are embedded in each and thus a
rough comparison with Daubert-Kumho is possible.
A. Delaware v. Fensterer
71

In Delaware v. Fensterer, a 1985 decision, the Supreme Court
considered a confrontation challenge involving the basis of expert
testimony. Fensterer was charged with the murder of his live-in
fiancée whose body was discovered at a shopping center parking lot.
The prosecution contended that Fensterer had strangled the victim
in their apartment with a cat leash. The government’s case rested on
circumstantial evidence. Two hairs on the leash were similar to the
victim’s hair, and an FBI analyst testified that one of the two hairs had
been “forcibly removed.” The prosecution argued that the hair had
been dislodged during the strangulation. According to the Delaware
Supreme Court, the expert’s testimony “established the leash as the
murder weapon” and “[t]he leash belonged to Fensterer and [the
72
victim].”
The FBI expert testified that there are three methods to
determine whether hair has been forcibly removed but could not
73
remember which method he had used in reaching his conclusion.
He testified: “As to the exact manner in which this particular hair was
forcibly removed, I don’t know. I have no indication in my notes
74
other than the fact it was forcibly removed.”
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that the FBI
expert’s lack of memory precluded the defense from effectively
testing the basis for his opinion by cross-examination. This, the court
reasoned, violated the accused’s confrontation rights because a
71

474 U.S. 15 (1985).
State v. Fensterer, 493 A.2d 959, 964 (Del. 1985).
73
The three methods are as follows: (1) The presence of a follicular tag on the
hair, (2) the presence of an elongated and misshaped root, and (3) the presence of a
sheath of skin surrounding the root area.
74
493 A.2d at 963 (quoting record of trial). A defense expert vigorously
challenged the proposition that the presence of a follicular tag indicated forcible
removal. He maintained that “scientific authority contradicted” this theory. Id. at
964. The defense expert further testified that he had telephoned the FBI expert who
had stated that his opinion rested on the “follicular tag” theory. The defense expert
testified “that he had spoken by telephone with [the prosecution expert], who
advised him that his conclusion of forcible removal was based on the presence of the
follicular tag.” Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 17.
72

1084

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33:1071

Special Agent from the FBI “can appear to be a highly credible
75
person to the average lay jury” and effective cross-examination
depends on the expert’s committing himself to a basis for his
opinion. “Without an acknowledgment of the basis of his opinion,
defense counsel’s cross-examination of the Agent was nothing more
76
than an exercise in futility.”
The United States Supreme Court disagreed and reversed per
77
curiam—without briefs or argument. According to the Court, “the
Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective crossexamination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way,
78
and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”
On remand,
however, the Delaware Supreme Court again held the opinion
inadmissible but on evidentiary, rather than constitutional, grounds.
According to that court: “While a witness’s mere lack of memory as to
a particular fact may go only to the weight of that evidence, an expert
witness’s inability to establish a sufficient basis for his opinion clearly
79
renders the opinion inadmissible under D.R.E. 705.”
80
In a later case, United States v. Owens, the United States Supreme
Court, citing Fensterer, applied the same rationale to a lay witness’s
81
memory lapse.
However, the two cases could have easily been
75

Fensterer, 493 A.2d at 964.
Id.
77
Justice Marshall dissented “from this summary disposition, which has been
ordered without affording the parties prior notice or an opportunity to file briefs on
the merits.” 474 U.S. at 23 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun also voted for
“plenary consideration,” as did Justice Stevens, who referred to the case as “novel.”
Id.
78
Id. at 20. Later in the opinion the Court returned to this point, writing that
“the Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and
fair opportunity to probe and expose . . . infirmities through cross-examination,
thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight
to the witness’ testimony.” Id. at 22. The Court held that a sufficient opportunity was
provided at trial because the defense counsel’s cross-examination “demonstrated to
the jury that [the expert] could not even recall the theory on which his opinion was
based. Moreover, through its own expert witness, the defense was able to suggest to
the jury that [the FBI expert] had relied on a theory which the defense expert
considered baseless.” Id. at 20.
79
Fensterer v. State, 509 A.2d 1106, 1109-10 (Del. 1986).
80
484 U.S. 554 (1988).
81
Id. at 559-60. A hospitalized witness, suffering from a fractured skull, identified
Owens as his attacker and picked his picture from a photo array. At trial, the witness
testified about the attack, including his hospital identification of Owens. On
cross-examination, however, he admitted that he could not remember seeing his
assailant. The Supreme Court held that the witness’s impaired memory did not
deprive Owens of the right of cross-examination. According to the Court, the
Confrontation Clause guarantees only an opportunity for effective
cross-examination. This right is satisfied when the defendant has the opportunity to
76
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distinguished. It is one thing to acknowledge that we often can do
little to prevent memory lapses of lay witnesses (which resulted from a
severe beating in Owens); it is quite another thing to say the same
about an expert. There is no valid reason, legal or scientific, that
justifies the failure to document forensic analyses. The American
82
Society of Crime Laboratory Directors recommends it, as did the
83
first DNA report published by the National Academy of Sciences.
Contrast Fensterer with Daubert’s language concerning the
scientific method: “Proposed testimony must be supported by
appropriate validation—i.e., ‘good grounds,’ based on what is
84
known.” Compare Fensterer with Kumho Tire where the Court wrote:
“Daubert pointed out that Federal Rules 702 and 703 grant expert
witnesses testimonial latitude unavailable to other witnesses on the
‘assumption that the expert’s opinion will have a reliable basis in the
85
knowledge and experience of his discipline.’” Is there anything less
86
scientific than failing to record test results?
bring out such matters as a witness’s faulty memory.
82
The American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors (ASCLD) issued
guidelines on casework documentation and reporting. Proper documentation
requires a system of note keeping that records the basis for any findings, conclusions,
and interpretations, and the retention of all notes, charts, photographs, or diagrams.
“The documentation should be such that a knowledgeable analyst or supervisor, in
the absence of the primary analyst, would be able to evaluate and interpret the data.”
ASCLD, Guidelines for Forensic Laboratory Management Practices, 14 CRIME LABORATORY
DIG. 39, 43 (Apr. 1987). Competent laboratory reports must include (1) an
“accurate summary of significant material contained in the case notes,” (2)
“interpretive information as well as examination results wherever possible,” and (3)
identification of “the analyst(s) and, if appropriate, the testing methodology.” Id.
83
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 104-05
(1992) [hereinafter DNA TECHNOLOGY]. The report concluded that:
The ideal program would contain mechanisms to ensure that: . . . Case
records—such as notes, worksheets, autoradiographs, and population
databanks—and other data or records that support examiners’
conclusions are prepared, retained by the laboratory, and made
available for inspection on court order after review of the
reasonableness of a request.
Id.
84
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
85
Kumho, 526 U.S. at 148 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592). Fensterer can also be
compared to amended Rule 702, which requires that expert testimony be “based
upon sufficient facts or data.” FED. R. EVID. 702(1).
86
Georgia Supreme Court Justice George T. Smith criticized the practice as
follows:
It is an insult to intelligent people to say that a scientific test was
conducted from which absolutely no notes or records survive. . . . A
basic principle of scientific testing is that careful records of test
procedure and results are to be scrupulously maintained. A scientific
test without an accompanying report of the testing environment,
number of trials, raw results and analyzed data is in reality no test at all.
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Moreover, had Fensterer been decided the other way the chief
beneficiary in the long run may have been the prosecution because
its experts would have been required to have supporting
documentation, and perhaps the Inspector General’s 1997 Report on
the FBI laboratory would not have needed to recommend that
87
adequate case files be required.
Proper documentation can also preclude a number of abuses.
The Journal of Forensic Sciences, the official publication of the
American Academy of Forensic Sciences, published a symposium on
88
the ethical responsibilities of forensic scientists in 1989. One article
discussed a number of laboratory reporting practices, including (1)
“preparation of reports containing minimal information in order not
to give the ‘other side’ ammunition for cross-examination,” (2)
“reporting of findings without an interpretation on the assumption
that if an interpretation is required it can be provided from the
witness box,” and (3) “[o]mitting some significant point from a
89
report to trap an unsuspecting cross-examiner.”
These practices
could be curbed, if not eliminated, by the implementation of proper
documentation requirements.
B. Arizona v. Youngblood
90

In the 1970s, courts began to extend the Brady doctrine to the
91
preservation of evidence. In addition to due process, the right of
Law v. State, 307 S.E.2d 904, 908 (Ga. 1983) (Smith, J., dissenting).
87
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE FBI LABORATORY: AN
INVESTIGATION INTO LABORATORY PRACTICES AND ALLEGED MISCONDUCT IN EXPLOSIVESRELATED AND OTHER CASES (1997) [hereinafter FBI LABORATORY]. “The Rudolph
files and some of Martz’s work underscore the importance of case files containing all
the documentation necessary for another appropriately qualified examiner to be
able to understand and replicate the examiner’s data and analysis. We encountered
the problem of incomplete or missing documentation in many case files.” Id., pt. 1,
at 25.
88
Symposium, Ethical Conflicts in the Forensic Sciences, 34 J. FORENSIC SCI. 717-93
(1989).
89
Douglas M. Lucas, The Ethical Responsibilities of the Forensic Scientist: Exploring the
Limits, 34 J. FORENSIC SCI. 719, 724 (1989). Lucas was the Director of the Centre of
Forensic Sciences for the Ministry of the Solicitor General, Toronto, Ontario.
90
In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court recognized the
prosecution’s constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence. The Court wrote:
“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id. at 87.
91
See generally 3 WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.5(h) (3d ed.
1999); Che H. Lee, Comment, The Prosecution’s Duty to Preserve Evidence Before Trial, 72
CAL. L. REV. 1019 (1984); Comment, Judicial Response to Government Loss or Destruction
of Evidence, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 542 (1972).
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preservation may be supported by the compulsory process and right
93
The right of preservation was
of confrontation guarantees.
extensively litigated in scientific evidence cases.
Defendants
successfully argued that this right had been violated by the
94
95
96
prosecution’s failure to preserve drugs, bullets, a fingertip,
97
98
99
blood, urine, and trace metal detection results, as well as physical
100
101
102
evidence of arson, rape, and homicide. Nevertheless, the scope
of the right remained uncertain.
103
In Arizona v. Youngblood, the Supreme Court addressed the
92

See Gov’t of V.I. v. Testamark, 570 F.2d 1162, 1166 (3d Cir. 1978) (“Loss or
destruction of relevant evidence . . . may also deny a defendant the right to
compulsory process.”); Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV.
71, 174-75 n.485 (1974) (“The government’s failure to preserve material evidence in
the defendant’s favor . . . violates his right of compulsory process because it
precludes him from effectively producing the evidence in court.”).
93
See Johnson v. State, 249 So. 2d 470, 472 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971)
(confrontation right to reexamine incriminatory bullet); People v. Taylor, 369
N.E.2d 573, 576 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (confrontation and due process rights to
preservation of heroin for independent examination).
94
E.g., People v. Clements, 661 P.2d 267, 273 (Colo. 1983) (failure to preserve
nondangerous materials used to manufacture drugs violates due process); People v.
Gomez, 596 P.2d 1192, 1197 (Colo. 1979) (consumption of heroin in unnecessary
tests violates due process); Stipp v. State, 371 So. 2d 712 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)
(consumption of cocaine); People v. Dodsworth, 376 N.E.2d 449, 451 (Ill. App. Ct.
1978) (consumption of MDMA); People v. Taylor, 369 N.E.2d 573, 576 (Ill. App. Ct.
1977) (consumption of heroin); Green v. Commonwealth, 684 S.W.2d 13, 16 (Ky.
1984) (consumption of drugs); People v. Wagstaff, 484 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (App. Div.
1985) (destruction of marijuana).
95
See Johnson v. State, 249 So. 2d 470, 472 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
96
See People v. Morgan, 606 P.2d 1296, 1298 (Colo. 1980).
97
See People v. Collins, 730 P.2d 293, 297-99 (Colo. 1986); see also People v.
Garries, 645 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Colo. 1982); State v. Swanson, 722 P.2d 1155, 1158
(Mont. 1986); State v. Kersting, 623 P.2d 1095, 1103-04 (Or. App. 1981); State v.
Lovato, 617 P.2d 169, 171 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).
98
See People v. Moore, 666 P.2d 419, 423 (Cal. 1983).
99
See People ex rel. Gallagher v. District Court, 656 P.2d 1287, 1292 (Colo. 1983).
100
See State v. Hannah, 583 P.2d 888, 889 (Ariz. 1978) (inadvertent destruction of
arson evidence violates due process).
101
See Hilliard v. Spalding, 719 F.2d 1443, 1447 (9th Cir. 1983) (failure to preserve
sperm sample); Deberry v. State, 457 A.2d 744, 747 (Del. 1983) (failure to preserve
clothing for blood analysis violates Brady); State v. Havas, 601 P.2d 1197, 1198 (Nev.
1979) (failure to preserve victim’s clothing required dismissal).
102
See People v. Sheppard, 701 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1985) (vehicle destroyed); see also
State v. Wright, 557 P.2d 1, 67 (Wash. 1976) (victim’s clothing destroyed); People v.
Harmes, 560 P.2d 470, 473 (Colo. 1976) (failure to preserve videotape of alleged
assault violated due process).
103
488 U.S. 51 (1988). In an earlier case, California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479
(1984), the Supreme Court ruled that due process did not require the preservation
of additional breath samples as part of intoxication testing. According to the Court:
Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve
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issue in a case involving the failure to preserve semen in a sexual
104
While bad faith is not a
assault case. The evidence was critical.
requirement in the Brady suppression cases, the Supreme Court
nevertheless ruled it determinative in a failure to preserve situation.
The Court added: “The failure of the police to refrigerate the
clothing and to perform tests on the semen samples can at worst be
105
described as negligent.”
106
while
Some courts have found “bad faith destruction,”
evidence, that duty must be limited to evidence that might be expected
to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense. To meet this
standard of constitutional materiality, . . . [the] evidence must both
possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was
destroyed, and also be of such a nature that the defendant would be
unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available
means.
Id. at 488-89. The Court held that neither of these conditions was satisfied. Given
the reliability of the intoxilyzer, “breath samples were much more likely to provide
inculpatory [rather] than exculpatory evidence.” Id. at 489. Moreover, alternative
methods of attacking intoxilyzer results were available; the defendant had the right
under state law to inspect the intoxilyzer, the right to introduce evidence to show
possible interference with the machine’s measurements, and the right to crossexamine the police concerning operator error. Id. at 490. Youngblood differed from
Trombetta, however. A serious crime was involved in the former, not a DUI
prosecution. Moreover, Youngblood concerned the preservation of evidence already
in the police’s possession, not the preservation of evidence that the police would not
ordinarily retain.
104
Dissenting, Justice Blackmun wrote:
But we do know several important things about the evidence. First, the
semen samples on the clothing undoubtedly came from the assailant.
Second, the samples could have been tested, using technology available
and in use at the local police department, to show either the blood
type of the assailant, or that the assailant was a nonsecreter, i.e.,
someone who does not secrete a blood-type “marker” into other body
fluids, such as semen. Third, the evidence was clearly important. A
semen sample in a rape case where identity is questioned is always
significant. Fourth, a reasonable police officer should have recognized
that the clothing required refrigeration. Fifth, we know that an
inconclusive test was done on the swab. The test suggested that the
assailant was a nonsecreter, although it was equally likely that the
sample on the swab was too small for accurate results to be obtained.
And, sixth, we know that respondent is a secreter. If the samples on
the clothing had been tested, and the results had shown either the
blood type of the assailant or that the assailant was a nonsecreter, its
constitutional materiality would be clear.
Id. at 68 (citations omitted) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
105
Id. at 58.
106
E.g., United States v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904, 906 (10th Cir. 1994) (Government
denied defendants “a meaningful opportunity to present a defense by intentionally
disposing of potentially exculpatory and highly probative evidence in the face of
[defendants’] repeated requests for pretrial access to that evidence”); United States
v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 928, 932 (9th
Cir. 1993) (bad faith destruction of
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107

numerous courts have not. This is not surprising since the standard
108
is a difficult one to satisfy. Indeed, the Youngblood approach was so
out-of-line with notions of basic fairness that an overwhelming
number of state courts have rejected it as a matter of state
109
constitutional law. The Alabama Supreme Court, for instance, has
methamphetamine lab equipment violates due process); People v. Walker, 628
N.E.2d 971, 973 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (determining that destruction of clothing
satisfies the demanding Youngblood test and finding items that were destroyed within
six weeks of the crime were based on improper authorization); State v. Jordan, 597
N.E.2d 1165, 1169 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (“[B]y destroying and then substituting
other evidence and securing indictments based upon it, the police actions in
themselves constituted a [due process] violation . . . .”).
107
E.g., Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 625 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Nor did the
failure to conduct tests on the semen sample violate Villafuerte’s due process rights.
The record contains no evidence that the semen sample could have had exculpatory
value which was apparent at the time the officers failed to perform the tests.”); Jones
v. McCaughtry, 965 F.2d 473, 477-78 (7th Cir. 1992) (failure to preserve non-motile
sperm); Paradis v. Arave, 954 F.2d 1483, 1488-89 (9th Cir. 1992) (panties negligently
lost); United States v. McKie, 951 F.2d 399, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (crack cocaine lost
after lab tests); United States v. Sandoval, 913 F. Supp. 494, 497 (S.D. Tex. 1995)
(“[T]here is no indication . . . that the agents destroyed the marijuana to circumvent
disclosure requirements or for any other improper motive.”); State v. Baldwin, 618
A.2d 513, 522 (Conn. 1993) (mistaken destruction of narcotic vials); State v.
Dulaney, 493 N.W.2d 787, 791 (Iowa 1992) (routine destruction of blood sample);
State v. Mabe, 412 S.E.2d 386, 388 (S.C. 1991) (destruction of cocaine).
108
See generally Note, The Role of Police Culpability in Leon and Youngblood, 76 VA. L.
REV. 1213, 1223 n.59 (1990) (“Of course, there is the additional difficulty of proving
that the police knew the evidence to be exculpatory. Few officers will be willing to
admit they destroyed evidence they knew to be exculpatory.”).
109
In State v. Morales, 657 A.2d 585 (Conn. 1995), the Connecticut Supreme
Court recognized that:
Apparently only Arizona and California . . . have concluded that their
state charters offer the same limited degree of protection as the federal
constitution. Like our sister states, we conclude that the good or bad
faith of the police in failing to preserve potentially useful evidence
[semen stains that could have been tested for DNA] cannot be
dispositive of whether a criminal defendant has been deprived of due
process of law. Accordingly, we, too, reject the litmus test of bad faith
on the part of the police, which the United States Supreme Court
adopted under the federal constitution in Youngblood.
Id. at 594 n.20; see, e.g., Thorne v. Department of Public Safety, 774 P.2d 1326, 1331
n.9 (Alaska 1989) (“We have construed the Alaska Constitution’s Due Process Clause
to not require a showing of bad faith.”); State v. Matafeo, 787 P.2d 671, 673 (Haw.
1990) (bad faith test too restrictive because it precludes courts “in cases where no
bad faith is shown, from inquiring into the favorableness of the evidence or the
prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of its loss”); Commonwealth v.
Henderson, 582 N.E.2d 496, 497 (Mass. 1991) (“The rule under the due process
provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution is stricter than that stated in the
Youngblood opinion.”); State v. Osakalumi, 461 S.E.2d 504, 512 (W. Va. 1995) (“As a
matter of state constitutional law, we find that fundamental fairness requires this
Court to evaluate the State’s failure to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence in
the context of the entire record.”); State v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632, 643 (Vt. 1994)
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recognized an exception to the bad faith test where the evidence is so
critical to the defense as to make a criminal trial without it
110
“fundamentally unfair.” The court applied this exception in a toxic
waste dumping prosecution where the sole evidence, the samples
tested, was not preserved. Similarly, the Delaware Supreme Court
rejected Youngblood and set forth a three-pronged analysis: (1) the
degree of negligence or bad faith involved; (2) the importance of the
missing evidence, considering the probative value and reliability of
secondary or substitute evidence that remains available; and (3) the
sufficiency of the other evidence used at trial to sustain the
111
conviction.
The Youngblood test provides no incentive for police departments
to adopt standard operating procedures that ensure the proper
collection and preservation of evidence. Larry Youngblood was later
exonerated through DNA testing—after having spent nine years in
prison. Dr. Edward Blake, a DNA scientist, told a reporter:
We now have before us a flawed legal precedent that stands on
the shoulders of an innocent man. . . . For those organizations
that are poorly run or mismanaged or don’t give a damn, . . . the
Youngblood case was a license to let down their guard and be lazy.
The effect that had was generally to lower the standards of
112
evidence collection.

C. Barefoot v. Estelle
113

Barefoot v. Estelle, a capital murder case decided by the Court in
1983, is the case most closely related to Daubert. In the penalty phase,
(Youngblood decision “too narrow because it limits due process violations to only
those cases in which a defendant can demonstrate bad faith, even though the
negligent loss of evidence may critically prejudice a defendant”).
110
Ex parte Gingo, 605 So. 2d 1237, 1241 (Ala. 1992); see also Gurley v. State, 639
So. 2d 557 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (failure to preserve murder victim’s wallet for
defense testing violates state constitution).
111
Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 87 (Del. 1989). The Hammond court did not
foreclose the possibility of conviction despite the state’s failure to properly preserve
evidence:
We remain convinced that fundamental fairness, as an element of due
process, requires the State’s failure to preserve evidence that could be
favorable to the defendant “[to] be evaluated in the context of the
entire record. . . .” When evidence has not been preserved, the
conduct of the State’s agents is a relevant consideration, but it is not
determinative.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
112
Barbara Whiteaker, DNA Frees Inmate Years After Justices Rejected Plea, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 11, 2000, at A12.
113
463 U.S. 880 (1983). For a further discussion of Barefoot, see Giannelli, supra
note 12.
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the prosecution offered psychiatric testimony concerning Barefoot’s
114
future dangerousness. One psychiatrist, Dr. James Grigson, without
ever examining Barefoot, testified that there was a “‘one hundred
percent and absolute’ chance that Barefoot would commit future acts of
115
criminal violence.”
Barefoot challenged the admission of this
evidence on constitutional grounds due to its unreliability.
In an amicus brief, the American Psychiatric Association (APA)
stated that the “large body of research in this area indicates that, even
under the best of conditions, psychiatric predictions of long-term
116
dangerousness are wrong in at least two out of every three cases.”
In a later passage, the brief noted that the “unreliability of [these]
117
predictions is by now an established fact within the profession.” A
118
substantial body of research supported the APA position.
Nevertheless, the Court rejected Barefoot’s argument.
According to the Court, “[n]either petitioner nor the [APA] suggests
that psychiatrists are always wrong with respect to future
119
dangerousness, only most of the time.” In another passage, the Court
noted that it was “not persuaded that such testimony is almost entirely
unreliable and that the factfinder and the adversary system will not be
competent to uncover, recognize, and take due account of its
120
shortcomings.”
If this is a standard at all, it is an incredibly low one. It permitted
the admission of evidence, as one commentator noted, “at the brink
121
122
of quackery” —and, in a death penalty case. Justice Blackmun, the
author of the Daubert opinion, dissented:
114

Future dangerousness was a qualifying factor under the Texas death penalty
statute. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(b)(1) (West 1981) (requiring a
jury finding that “there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society”).
115
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting from record).
116
Brief Amicus Curiae for the American Psychiatric Association at 9, Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080).
117
Id. at 12.
118
See generally Charles Patrick Ewing, Preventive Detention and Execution: The
Constitutionality of Punishing Future Crimes, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 139 (1991);
Michael L. Radelet & James W. Marquart, Assessing Nondangerousness During Penalty
Phases of Capital Trials, 54 ALB. L. REV. 845 (1990); Christopher Slobogin,
Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97 (1984).
119
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 901 (emphasis added).
120
Id. at 898-99
121
George E. Dix, The Death Penalty, “Dangerousness,” Psychiatric Testimony, and
Professional Ethics, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 151, 172 (1977).
122
On October 24, 1984, Thomas Barefoot was executed based on “junk science.”
PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 220 (1991)
(noting that one could favor the death penalty and “yet still recoil at the thought that
a junk science fringe of psychiatry . . . could decide who will be sent to the gallows”).
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In the present state of psychiatric knowledge, this is too much for
me. One may accept this in a routine lawsuit for money damages,
but when a person’s life is at stake . . . a requirement of greater
reliability should prevail. In a capital case, the specious testimony
of a psychiatrist, colored in the eyes of an impressionable jury by
the inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist’s words,
123
equates with death itself.

In short, Daubert required a far higher standard of admissibility for
money-damages than Barefoot required for the death penalty. Nor
can Barefoot be distinguished from Daubert as a constitutional, rather
124
than an evidentiary, decision.
The Court’s Eighth Amendment
125
jurisprudence has long proclaimed that “death is different” and
126
imposed higher reliability standards.
D. United States v. Scheffer
127

United States v. Scheffer is in one sense the most difficult case to
criticize. In Scheffer, the Supreme Court upheld the military’s per se
exclusionary rule of polygraph results in the face of a constitutional
128
129
challenge.
Given the state of polygraph research, the Court
130
might have rested its decision on reliability grounds alone.
Nevertheless, even the unreliability argument is not without
problems. The most notable is the comparison with Barefoot. The
research on polygraph evidence is far more supportive than that on
123

Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 916.
One commentary points out that “Barefoot explicitly did not involve the Rules,
but rather the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty based on questionable
evidence.” Bert Black & John A. Singer, From Frye to Daubert: A New Test for Scientific
Evidence, 1 SHEPARD’S EXPERT & SCI. EVIDENCE Q. 19, 37 (July 1993).
125
See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 605-06 (2002) (“As Arizona’s counsel
maintained at oral argument, there is no doubt that ‘[d]eath is different.’”).
126
E.g., Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989) (“The finality of the death
penalty requires ‘a greater degree of reliability’ when it is imposed.”) (quoting
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38
(1980) (Because the death penalty is different, the Court has “invalidated procedural
rules that tended to diminish the reliability of the sentencing determination.”). See
also Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 87 (1985) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“In capital
cases the finality of the sentence imposed warrants protections that may or may not
be required in other cases.”).
127
523 U.S. 303 (1998).
128
Id. at 313.
129
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION 29-30 (2002)
[hereinafter POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION]. Even here I have serious reservations
about the Court’s treatment of the right to present a defense, as well as its attempts
to distinguish Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), and Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284 (1973).
130
As discussed later, however, the Court based its holding on several distinct
grounds.
124
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“future dangerousness.” Polygraph evidence easily satisfies the
Barefoot test: not “always wrong . . . only most of the time.” Keep in
mind that the Court’s options were not limited to per se admission or
exclusion. The Court could have rejected the per se ban, as it did with
131
hypnotically-refreshed testimony in Rock v. Arkansas, and left the
issue to the states to develop alternative reliability standards, which
132
had been the military court’s position.
Such an approach would
have probably resulted in what now exists in federal cases—trial court
discretion that is typically exercised in favor of exclusion in the
133
absence of a prosecution stipulation.
Moreover, the Court never confronted an issue raised by Justice
134
Stevens in dissent and mentioned by Justice Kennedy in his
135
concurring opinion.
The very government that argued against
131

483 U.S. 44 (1987) (holding that prohibiting all hypnotically refreshed
testimony violated the defendant’s right to testify on her own behalf but leaving open
the possibility that exclusion on a case-by-case approach would be constitutional).
132
In Scheffer, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces had held that
Military Rule 707’s per se exclusionary rule was unconstitutional as applied in that
case. In that court’s view:
A per se exclusion of polygraph evidence offered by an accused to rebut
an attack on his credibility, without giving him an opportunity to lay a
foundation under Mil. R. Evid. 702 and Daubert, violates his Sixth
Amendment right to present a defense. We limit our holding to
exculpatory evidence arising from a polygraph examination of an
accused, offered to rebut an attack on his credibility.
Scheffer, 44 M.J. 442, 445 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
133
E.g., Conti v. Commissioner, 39 F.3d 658, 663 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that
“unilaterally obtained polygraph evidence is almost never admissible under Evidence
Rule 403”); United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1216-17 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[A]
privately commissioned polygraph test, which was unknown to the government until
after its completion, is of extremely dubious probative value.”). See also 1 GIANNELLI
& IMWINKELRIED, supra note 7, § 8.4(D).
134
Justice Stevens wrote:
[T]o the extent that the use of the lie detector plays a special role in
the military establishment, military practices are more favorable to a
rule of admissibility than is the less structured use of lie detectors in the
civilian sector of our society. That is so because the military carefully
regulates the administration of polygraph tests to ensure reliable
results. The military maintains “very stringent standards for polygraph
examiners” and has established its own Polygraph Institute, which is
“generally considered to be the best training facility for polygraph
examiners in the United States.” The military has administered
hundreds of thousands of such tests and routinely uses their results for
a wide variety of official decisions.
Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 323-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
135
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy stated:
I doubt, though, that the rule of per se exclusion is wise, and some later
case might present a more compelling case for introduction of the
testimony than this one does. Though the considerable discretion
given to the trial court in admitting or excluding scientific evidence is
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polygraph evidence nevertheless spends millions of dollars each year
running the Defense Polygraph Institute, sponsors research on the
technique, and employs the technique both in and outside of the
136
criminal system.
Perhaps to avoid these issues, the Court attempted to support its
position with other rationales, none of which are very compelling.
One rationale was that polygraph evidence would violate the ultimate
137
issue prohibition.
However, commentators have harshly criticized
138
the ultimate issue rule, and both the Federal and Military Rules of
139
Evidence have rejected the rule outright. Should DNA evidence be
excluded because it treads upon the “ultimate” issue in the case—the
identity of the perpetrator? Fingerprint comparisons? Future
dangerousness was an ultimate issue in Barefoot.
Second, the majority cited the jury’s role in determining
140
credibility. This argument needs further examination. Assume the
accused claims alibi and DNA evidence is admitted against him; the
DNA evidence will undoubtedly reflect on the accused’s credibility,
and yet no one would suggest DNA evidence is inadmissible on this
ground. The Court, of course, may have only been concerned with a
“direct” comment on credibility. But as one commentator noted:
[T]he very fact that jurors possess common knowledge about
credibility puts them in a good position to come to their own
conclusions; they may therefore be more skeptical about an
expert’s testimony on credibility than about testimony on a more
esoteric issue, such as DNA profiling. Some support for this
contention comes from the studies of jury reactions to polygraph
evidence, which have generally found that juries are not
overwhelmed: they draw their own conclusions about credibility,

not a constitutional mandate, see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., . . . there is some tension between that rule and our holding today.
And, as Justice Stevens points out, there is much inconsistency between
the Government’s extensive use of polygraphs to make vital security
determinations and the argument it makes here, stressing the
inaccuracy of these tests.
Id. at 318 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
136
See Giannelli, supra note 51.
137
Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 313-14 (“Jurisdictions, in promulgating rules of evidence,
may legitimately be concerned about the risk that juries will give excessive weight to
the opinions of a polygrapher, clothed as they are in scientific expertise and at time
offering, as in respondents’ case, a conclusion of the ultimate issue in the trial.”).
138
7 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1920, at 18 (Chadbourn rev. 1978) (calling
the rule “a mere bit of empty rhetoric”).
139
See FED. R. EVID. 704(a); MIL. R. EVID. 704.
140
Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 313 (“By its very nature, polygraph evidence may diminish
the jury’s role in making credibility determinations.”).
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not always agreeing with the polygrapher’s verdict.141

Finally, an additional red herring was offered to support the
Scheffer holding: the avoidance of litigation on collateral issues that
“prolong[] criminal trials and threaten[] to distract the jury from its
142
Justice
central function of determining guilt or innocence.”
Holmes once explained this factor: “[S]o far as the introduction of
collateral issues goes, that objection is a purely practical one—a
143
concession to the shortness of life.”
Weighed against this
“consideration” is the constitutional right to present a defense, which
the Court has described as a fundamental right: “The right to offer
the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if
necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to
present the defendant’s version of the facts. . . . The [defendant] has
the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This
144
right is a fundamental element of due process of law.”
Thus, it
seems rather breathtaking that such a “fundamental” right could be
145
so easily trumped by a lack-of-time rationale.
The admissibility of
DNA evidence often consumes a lot of court time but “collateralness”
146
was never cited as a major concern.
E. Ake v. Oklahoma
Painting this picture of the Supreme Court decisions would be
147
unfair without mentioning Ake v. Oklahoma, in which the Court in
1985 recognized for the first time an accused’s right to expert
148
assistance. Although Ake has often been interpreted narrowly, it
141

REDMAYNE, supra note 1, at 174.
Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 314.
143
Reeve v. Dennett, 11 N.E. 938, 943-44 (Mass. 1887).
144
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967); see also Crane v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of
the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense.’”) (citations omitted).
145
See generally Janet C. Hoeffel, The Sixth Amendment’s Lost Clause: Unearthing
Compulsory Process, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1275; Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Defense of the
Right to Present Defense Expert Testimony: The Flaws in the Plurality Opinion in United
States v. Scheffer, 69 TENN. L. REV. 539 (2002).
146
See United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 168 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (“[H]earings
were held for approximately six weeks.”); see also People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985,
986 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (“This hearing took place over a twelve week period producing a
transcript of approximately five thousand pages.”).
147
470 U.S. 68 (1985).
148
See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
802 (6th ed. 2000) (“Generally speaking the courts have read Ake narrowly, and have
refused to require appointment of an expert unless it is absolutely essential to the
142
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remains a landmark case, and the Court deserves credit for
recognizing this right. Nevertheless, the Court has passed up many
opportunities to strengthen Ake. That case also stands in stark relief
to permitting bogus evidence in death penalty cases (Barefoot),
refusing to require the police to implement reasonable measures to
ensure the safe handling of evidence (Youngblood), and turning a
blind eye toward expert testimony lacking such a rudimentary basis as
documentation (Fensterer).
IV. DAUBERT’S EFFECT IN CRIMINAL CASES
As stated earlier, Daubert has had a far more significant impact in
civil litigation than in criminal litigation. That is not say, however,
that its affect in criminal cases has been insubstantial. Several
significant developments in criminal prosecutions can be traced to
Daubert, five of which are discussed in this section.
A. Reexamination of “Venerable” Techniques
First, some federal courts have read the Daubert trilogy as inviting
a “reexamination even of ‘generally accepted’ venerable, technical
149
fields.” Attacks, some successful and some not, have been launched
150
151
against handwriting evidence,
hair comparisons,
fingerprint
defense.”)
149
United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67 (D. Mass. 1999); see also United
States v. Hidalgo, 229 F. Supp. 2d 961, 966 (D. Ariz. 2002) (“Courts are now
confronting challenges to testimony, as here, whose admissibility had long been
settled.”).
150
See Hidalgo, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 967. Hidalgo thusly limited the introduction of
expert handwriting evidence:
Because the principle of uniqueness is without empirical support, we
conclude that a document examiner will not be permitted to testify
that the maker of a known document is the maker of the questioned
document. Nor will a document examiner be able to testify as to
identity in terms of probabilities.
Id.; see also United States v. Lewis, 220 F. Supp. 2d 548, 554 (S.D. W. Va. 2002)
(“[Expert’s] bald assertion that the ‘basic principle of handwriting identification has
been proven time and time again through research in [his] field,’ without more
specific substance, is inadequate to demonstrate testability and error rate.”); United
States v. Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1103 (D. Alaska 2001). The Saelee court
highlighted the relative lack of credible testing of handwriting identification
methods:
There is little known about the error rates of forensic document
examiners. The little testing that has been done raises serious
questions about the reliability of methods currently in use. As to some
tasks, there is a high rate of error and forensic document examiners
may not be any better at analyzing handwriting than laypersons. This is
illustrated not only in the Kam studies relied on by Mr. Cawley, but also
in a series of proficiency tests carried out by Collaborative Testing
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firearms

identification,

153

bitemarks,

154

and

Service under the supervision of the Forensic Sciences Foundation.
Id.; see also United States v. Fujii, 152 F. Supp. 2d 939, 940 (N.D. Ill. 2000)
(determining that expert testimony concerning Japanese handprinting was
inadmissible and stating that: “Handwriting analysis does not stand up well under the
Daubert standards. Despite its long history of use and acceptance, validation studies
supporting its reliability are few, and the few that exist have been criticized for
methodological flaws.”); United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1038
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“[T]he testimony at the Daubert hearing firmly established that
forensic document examination, despite the existence of a certification program,
professional journals and other trappings of science, cannot, after Daubert, be
regarded as ‘scientific . . . knowledge.’”). But see United States v. Jolivet, 224 F.3d
902, 906 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming admission of expert testimony that it was likely
that defendant wrote the questioned documents and finding such opinion reliable
because the expert was well-qualified in handwriting analysis and that his testimony
“may be properly characterized as offering the jury knowledge beyond their own and
enhancing their understanding of the evidence before them”); United States v.
Prine, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (W.D. Wash. 2002). See generally Andre Moenssens,
Handwriting Identification Evidence In the Post-Daubert World, 66 UMKC L. REV. 251
(1997); D. Michael Risinger et al., Brave New “Post-Daubert World”—A Reply to Professor
Moenssens, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 405 (1998).
151
See Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1558 (E.D. Okl. 1995) (“This
court has been unsuccessful in its attempts to locate any indication that expert hair
comparison testimony meets any of the requirements of Daubert.”), rev’d on this issue,
Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1522-23 (10th Cir. 1997) (ruling that the due
process, not Daubert, standard applies in habeas proceedings); see also Paul C.
Giannelli & Emmie West, Hair Comparison Evidence, 37 CRIM. L. BULL. 514 (2001)
(discussing the DNA exoneration cases in which hair evidence was used to convict
the innocent).
152
See United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 558 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(excluding and then admitting fingerprint evidence); see also United States v.
Martinez-Cintron, 136 F. Supp. 2d 17, 20 (D. P.R. 2001) (admitting evidence);
United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (same), aff’d, 260 F.3d
597 (7th Cir. 2001); Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint
“Science” Is Revealed, 75 SO. CAL. L. REV. 605, 628 n.122 (2002) (“Internal documents
of the NIJ presently on file with the author . . . reveal that the Institute was ready to
publish the Solicitation in September of 1999, but that at the FBI’s request,
publication was delayed until after Mitchell’s trial.”). See generally Jennifer Mnookin,
Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 13 (2001); Jessica M.
Sombat, Note, Latent Justice: Daubert’s Impact on the Evaluation of Fingerprint
Identification Testimony, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2819 (2002); David A. Stoney, Fingerprint
Identification: The Scientific Basis of Expert Testimony on Fingerprinting Identification, §§ 272.0 - 2.4, in 3 MODERN SCI. EVIDENCE (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2002).
153
See United States v. Santiago, 199 F. Supp. 2d 101 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(determining that ballistics evidence satisfies the Daubert standard); see also Joan
Griffin & David J. LaMagna, Daubert Challenges to Forensic Evidence: Ballistics Next on
the Firing Line, CHAMPION 20 (Sept.-Oct. 2002); Lisa J. Steele, “All we want you to do is
confirm what we already know.” A Daubert Challenge to Firearms Identifications, 38 CRIM. L.
BULL. 465 (2002).
154
See Howard v. State, 697 So. 2d 415, 429 (Miss. 1997). The Supreme Court of
Missippi wrote:
While few courts have refused to allow some form of bite-mark
comparison evidence, numerous scholarly authorities have criticized
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155

intoxication testing.
Such challenges would not have occurred
under Frye. The handwriting challenges triggered research on that
156
157
subject
as well as the establishment of standards
and the
158
Moreover,
curtailment of overstated conclusions in some cases.
there have been more legal articles on these subjects in the last few

the reliability of this method of identifying a suspect. . . . There is little
consensus in the scientific community on the number of points which
must match before any positive identification can be announced. . . .
Suffice it to say that testimony concerning bite marks in soft, living
flesh has not been scientifically accredited at this time.
Id.; see also I.A. Pretty & D. Sweet, The Scientific Basis for Human Bitemark Analyses—A
Critical Review, 41 SCI. & JUST. 85, 86 (2001) (“Despite the continued acceptance of
bitemark evidence in European, Oceanic and North American Courts, the
fundamental scientific basis for bitemark analysis has never been established.”).
155
See United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 549 (D. Md. 2002). As the
court described it:
The doctrine of judicial notice is predicated upon the assumption that
the source materials from which the court takes judicial notice are
reliable. Where, as here, that reliability has been challenged, the court
cannot disregard the challenge, simply because a legion of earlier court
decisions reached conclusions based on reference to the same
then-unchallenged authority. . . . I cannot agree that the HGN, WAT
and OLS tests, singly or in combination, have been shown to be as
reliable as asserted by Dr. Burns, the NHTSA publications, and the
publications of the communities of law enforcement officers and state
prosecutors.
Id. (footnote omitted).
156
E.g., Sargur Srihari et al., Individuality of Handwriting, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 856
(2002) (1,500 individual handwriting samples scanned into a computer programmed
to compare the samples based on a variety of features such as slant, height, number
of interior contours, and number of vertical slope components; computer matched
exemplars with a 98% accuracy rate); see also Moshe Kam et al., Writer Identification by
Professional Document Examiners, 42 J. FORENSIC SCI. 778 (1997) (false positive rate for
professionals was 6.5% compared to 38.3% for non-professionals); Moshe Kam et al.,
Writer Identification by Professional Document Examiners, 42 J. FORENSIC SCI. 778 (1997)
(forensic document examiners demonstrated a false positive error rate of only .5%);
Moshe Kam et al., Effects of Monetary Incentives on Performance of Non-Professionals in
Document-Examination Proficiency Tests, 43 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1000 (1998).
157
See United States v. Gricco, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7564, *19 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
158
See United States v. Rutherford, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1194 (D. Neb. 2000).
The court refused to allow the introduction of a handwriting experts testimony,
stating:
[T]he Court concludes that FDE Rauscher’s testimony meets the
requirements of Rule 702 to the extent that he limits his testimony to
identifying and explaining the similarities and dissimilarities between
the known exemplars and the questioned documents. FDE Rauscher is
precluded from rendering any ultimate conclusions on authorship of
the questioned documents and is similarly precluded from testifying to
the degree of confidence or certainty on which his opinions are based.
Id.; accord United States v. Hidalgo, 229 F. Supp. 2d 961 (D. Ariz. 2002); United States
v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67 (D. Mass. 1999).
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159

years than in the prior quarter century, which should mean closer
scrutiny of this type of expert testimony for the foreseeable future.
Whether lawyers have the ability and resources to challenge this
testimony through cross-examination and the presentation of defense
experts, however, remains to be seen. Even so, the forensic science
160
community views these attacks as serious and is reforming.
B. Closing the Frye Loophole
Second, Daubert closed a major loophole in the Frye rule. Many
Frye courts recognize an exception for non-novel evidence, which
exempts certain techniques from the general acceptance
161
For example, California courts apply this exception
requirement.
162
to bitemark comparisons and evidence based on narcotic detection
163
dogs.
Similarly, Arizona courts use this exception to exempt
164
footprint evidence and predictions of recidivism using actuarial
165
Daubert explicitly rejected this “free
models from close scrutiny.
166
pass” to admissibility, and Kumho reinforced this view by subjecting
159

See supra notes 150-54.
See Graham R. Jones, President’s Editorial—The Changing Practice of Forensic
Science, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 437, 437 (2002). Jones pointed out the practical effects
Daubert had:
The Daubert Standard goes a step further than Frye and requires the
forensic scientists to prove that the evidence is fundamentally
scientifically reliable, not just generally accepted by his/her peers in
the discipline. Defense lawyers have also become more critical and
aggressive in challenging forensic evidence and are more willing to
hire qualified forensic experts to assist them.
Id.
161
See 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 7, § 1-5(D).
162
According to People v. Marx, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350 (Ct. App. 1975), the Frye test
“finds its rational basis in the degree to which the trier of fact must accept, on faith,
scientific hypotheses not capable of proof or disproof in court and not even generally
accepted outside the courtroom.” Id. at 355-56. The court went on to hold that bite
mark evidence did not involve blind acceptance by the jury. The basis on which the
expert reached his conclusions—models, photographs, and X-rays—were shown to
the trier of fact, and the expert’s conclusions were verifiable by the court. Thus, the
“court did not have to sacrifice its independence and common sense in evaluating”
the evidence. Id. at 357.
163
See People v. Sommer, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 165, 173 (Ct. App. 1993) (determining
that a narcotic detection dog was not subject to Frye).
164
See State v. Murray, 906 P.2d 542, 562 (Ariz. 1995) (en banc) (“Frye analysis is
not applicable to footprint [comparisons].”).
165
See State ex rel. Romley v. Fields, 35 P.3d 82, 89 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (“Based
upon our understanding of Frye as interpreted by Logerquist, we conclude that the use
of actuarial models by mental health experts to help predict a person’s likelihood of
recidivism is not the kind of novel scientific evidence or process to which Frye
applies.”).
166
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.11 (“Although the Frye decision itself focused
160
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all expert testimony to the reliability requirement.
C. Effect on Frye Standard
Daubert’s affect on the Frye test has also been noteworthy. Daubert
has forced state courts to reexamine their admissibility standard for
scientific evidence. Although numerous courts have rejected Frye in
167
168
favor of Daubert, some jurisdictions have retained Frye, and many
of these are populous states, in which many, if not most, criminal
cases are tried. Some of these courts believe Frye offers greater
169
protection for defendants than Daubert.
exclusively on ‘novel’ scientific techniques, we do not read the requirements of Rule
702 to apply specially or exclusively to unconventional evidence.”); see also People v.
Shreck, 22 P.3d 68, 79 n.12 (Colo. 2001). The Schrek court wrote:
We decline to limit the applicability of CRE 702 to only the novel
scientific evidence governed previously by Frye. Nothing in the text of
the rule requires such a limitation, and our holding is consistent with
that of the United States Supreme Court in Daubert, which expressly
applied its holding to all scientific evidence.
167
E.g., Shreck, 22 P.3d at 70. As the Schreck court clarified:
We now hold that CRE 702, rather than Frye, governs a trial court’s
determination as to whether scientific or other expert testimony should
be admitted. Such an inquiry should focus on the reliability and
relevance of the proffered evidence and requires a determination as to
(1) the reliability of the scientific principles, (2) the qualifications of
the witness, and (3) the usefulness of the testimony to the jury.
Id.; see, e.g., Schafersman v. Agland Coop., 631 P.3d 862, 867 (Neb. 2001) (describing
a veterinarian’s expert opinion on multiple mineral toxicity which alleged that cows
were injured by contaminated feed). “[W]e conclude that the framework for
evaluating expert opinion testimony in Nebraska should no longer be guided by Frye,
but should instead reflect the criteria set forth in Daubert and its progeny.” Id.
(citations omitted). Other states that have explicitly adopted Daubert include Alaska,
Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, and West Virginia. See 1 GIANNELLI &
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 7, § 1-13.
168
E.g., People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 323 (Cal. 1994) (The “Kelly formulation [of
Frye under the Cal. Evid. Code] survived Daubert . . . .”); People v. Miller, 670 N.E.2d
721, 731 (Ill. 1996) (“Illinois follows the Frye standard for the admission of novel
scientific evidence.”); Burral v. State, 724 A.2d 65, 80 (Md. 1999) (Despite Daubert,
“we have not abandoned Frye or Reed.”); Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 814
(Minn. 2000) (“Having reviewed the cases and the commentary surrounding this
issue, we reaffirm our adherence to the Frye-Mack standard and reject Daubert.”).
Other Frye jurisdictions include Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Kansas, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington.
See 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 7, § 1-15.
169
See Ramirez v. State, 810 So. 2d 836, 843 (Fla. 2001). The Florida Supreme
Court asserted that:
In keeping with the State’s burden in a criminal trial (i.e., the State
must prove each element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable
doubt), this Court has continued to use the Frye test when evaluating
novel scientific evidence proposed by the State even though the United
States Supreme Court, in a civil case, has adopted a different rule.
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170

In addition, terms such as gatekeeper, testability, and peer
171
review have crept into the Frye lexicon. Ramirez v. State illustrates
this development. In Ramirez, the Florida Supreme Court rejected
the testimony of five experts who claimed general acceptance for
matching a knife with a cartilage wound in a murder victim—a type
of “toolmark” comparison. The court wrote:
Although several of the State’s experts testified that the
underlying principle employed by Hart [the examiner] is
generally accepted in the field, we conclude that this testimony
standing alone is insufficient to establish admissibility under Frye
in light of the fact that Hart’s testing procedure possesses none of
the hallmarks of acceptability that apply in the relevant scientific
172
community to this type of evidence.

The court went on to note that the procedure had never been tested,
173
“meaningful peer review” was lacking, the error rate had not been
quantified, and objective standards had not been developed. Ramirez
174
175
represents a reinvigorated Frye test, and it is not alone.
Id; see also State v. Copeland, 922 P.2d 1304, 1314 (Wash. 1996) (en banc). The en
banc court determined that:
Where novel scientific evidence is at issue, the additional Frye inquiry
allows the judiciary to defer to the scientists precisely where to do so
recognizes both the need for admissibility of novel scientific evidence
where it is sufficiently accepted, and the need to protect against novel
scientific evidence which has not even gained general acceptance in
the relevant field. The trial court’s gatekeeper role under Frye involves
by design a conservative approach, requiring careful assessment of the
general acceptance of the theory and methodology of novel science,
thus helping to ensure, among other things, that “pseudoscience” is
kept out of the courtroom.
Id.
170
See Copeland, 922 P.2d at 1314 (describing the “trial court’s gatekeeper role
under Frye”).
171
810 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 2001).
172
Id. at 849 (emphasis added).
173
The court described the deficiencies:
The North American articles were written by law enforcement
technicians and while several of those articles address principles
related to Hart’s theory none undertakes the kind of searching, critical
review that is the sine qua non of scientific acceptance. The European
articles, on the other hand, were written by medical doctors and
professors and are far more discerning; they delineate general studies
and contain extensive analyses. The articles in that group, however,
address only traditional knife mark theory relative to striation
signatures. None address Hart’s testing methodology and the absolute
certainty of identification deduced from such a test.
Id. at 850 (footnotes omitted).
174
Ramirez, 810 So. 2d at 844 (Fla. 2001). The Florida Supreme Court stated:
When applying the Frye test, a court is not required to accept a “nose
count” of experts in the field. Rather, the court may peruse disparate
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D. Effect on Relevancy Approach
Daubert’s affect on the third approach to scientific evidence, the
relevancy approach, may have been the most profound—and yet the
least noticed. Under this approach, qualifying the expert generally
176
qualifies the technique employed by that expert. Barefoot illustrates
177
178
this approach.
This, of course, is a very lax standard, one which
Daubert implicitly rejected by requiring reliability in addition to
179
relevancy.
sources—e.g., expert testimony, scientific and legal publications, and
judicial opinions—and decide for itself whether the theory in issue has
been “sufficiently tested and accepted by the relevant scientific
community.” In gauging acceptance, the court must look to properties
that traditionally inhere in scientific acceptance for the type of
methodology or procedure under review—i.e., “indicia” or “hallmarks”
of acceptability. A bald assertion by the expert that his deduction is
premised upon well-recognized scientific principles is inadequate to
establish its admissibility if the witness’s application of these principles
is untested and lacks indicia of acceptability.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
175
See Wilson v. State, 803 A.2d 1044 (Md. 2002) (excluding under Frye probability
testimony concerning two children suffering sudden infant death snydrome (SIDS)).
176
See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1250 (1980).
177
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 930. “[T]he rules of evidence generally extant at the
federal and state levels anticipate that relevant, unprivileged evidence should be
admitted and its weight left to the factfinder, who would have the benefit of
cross-examination and contrary evidence by the opposing party.” Id. at 889. “We are
not persuaded that such testimony is almost entirely unreliable and that the
factfinder and the adversary system will not be competent to uncover, recognize, and
take due account of its shortcomings.” Id. at 882.
178
Wisconsin still follows the relevancy approach. See State v. Peters, 534 N.W.2d
867, 873 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (holding DNA evidence admissible). Wisconsin follows
neither Frye nor Daubert: “Once the relevancy of the evidence is established and the
witness is qualified as an expert, the reliability of the evidence is a weight and
credibility issue for the fact finder and any reliability challenges must be made
through cross-examination or by other means of impeachment.” Id.; see also State v.
Donner, 531 N.W.2d 369, 374 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (holding intoxication test
admissible). The Donner court wrote:
[B]efore Daubert, the Frye test was not the law in Wisconsin. To that
extent, Wisconsin law and Daubert coincide. Beyond that, Wisconsin
law holds that “any relevant conclusions which are supported by a
qualified witness should be received unless there are other reasons for
exclusion.”
Stated otherwise, expert testimony is admissible in
Wisconsin if relevant and will be excluded only if the testimony is
superfluous or a waste of time. . . . Assuming that Daubert in its
application represents something beyond Walstad, we observe that we .
. . are bound to follow our supreme court case law.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
179
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (“[U]nder the Rules the trial judge must ensure that
any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but
reliable.”); see also Kumho Tires Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (although

2003

“CRIMINAL” DAUBERT CASES

1103

A number of courts had rejected Frye before Daubert was
180
decided. Many of these courts now claim that Daubert is consistent
181
with their former approach. This is true in some instances but not
182
Many of these jurisdictions had, in effect, adopted the
in others.
relevancy approach, and their movement toward Daubert raises their
standard of admissibility.
E. The “Third-prong” Controversy: Daubert “Plus”
Finally, the 2000 amendment to Rule 702 can be traced to
183
184
It goes beyond Daubert and Kumho, however.
The
Daubert.
amendment, for instance, requires the proper application of the
expert qualified, testimony rejected).
180
Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Montana, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming. See 1 GIANNELLI
& IMWINKELRIED, supra note 7, § 1-14.
181
E.g., Moore v. State, 915 S.W.2d 284, 294 (Ark. 1996) (“Daubert . . . adopted a
reliability approach to Rule 702, comparable to the relevancy approach of Prater in
which reliability is the critical element.”); Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d 69, 73 (Del. 1993)
(“Our decisions [in prior cases] are consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Daubert.”); State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1123 (La. 1993) (“Past decisions of this
court have espoused similar sentiments [as Daubert] . . . .”); State v. Moore, 885 P.2d
457, 471 (Mont. 1994) (“[T]he guidelines set forth in Daubert are consistent with our
previous holding in Barmeyer concerning the admission of expert testimony of novel
scientific evidence, and we, therefore, adopt the Daubert standard . . . .”); DiPetrillo v.
Dow Chem. Co., 729 A.2d 677, 686 (R.I. 1999) (“Though we declined expressly to
adopt the Daubert I standard, our previous cases have endorsed its principles.”).
182
See State v. Williams, 446 N.E.2d 444, 448 (Ohio 1983). The Ohio position
merely left the issue to trial judge “discretion”:
[T]he Rules of Evidence establish adequate preconditions for
admissibility of expert testimony, and we leave to the discretion of this
state’s judiciary, on a case by case basis, to decide whether the
questioned testimony is relevant and will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
Id.
183
The following was added to Rule 702 in December, 2000: “(1) the testimony is
based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods
reliably to the facts of the case.” FED. R. EVID. 702.
184
See Rudd v. General Motors Corp., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1336-37 (M.D. Ala.
2001). The district court noted that:
[T]he new Rule 702 appears to require a trial judge to make an
evaluation that delves more into the facts than was recommended in
Daubert, including as the rule does an inquiry into the sufficiency of the
testimony’s basis (“the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data”)
and an inquiry into the application of a methodology to the facts (“the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of
the case”). Neither of these two latter questions that are now mandatory
under the new rule . . . were expressly part of the former admissibility
analysis under Daubert.
Id.
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technique in the particular case, thus settling the Frye-Daubert “plus”
issue, at least in federal courts.
This issue arose in the DNA cases where some courts had held
that, because of the “complexity” of DNA analysis and its “powerful
185
impact” on a jury, “passing muster under Frye alone is insufficient.”
Accordingly, a three-pronged analysis was adopted: (1) the
underlying theory must have been generally accepted, (2) the
procedures implementing the theory must have been generally
accepted, and (3) the testing laboratory must have followed these
186
procedures. This third prong was labeled Frye “plus.” Some federal
187
188
courts, in DNA and polygraph cases, applied this requirement
after Daubert was decided—i.e., Daubert “plus.” The issue was
surprisingly controversial, but this requirement had been applied pre189
DNA and pre-Daubert and is found in virtually every intoxication test
(DUI) statute in this country. Nevertheless, the courts had split on
the issue, with some holding that the application of proper
190
procedures went to weight and not admissibility.
Amended Rule
185

People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 987 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
See Stephanie B. Goldberg, A New Day for DNA?, 78 A.B.A. J. 84, 84 (1992) (“Frye
Plus”).
187
E.g., United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1197-98 (8th Cir. 1993). The
Eighth Circuit wrote:
We believe that the reliability inquiry set forth in Daubert mandates that
there be a preliminary showing that the expert properly performed a
reliable methodology in arriving at his opinion. . . . In order to
determine whether scientific testimony is reliable, the court must
conclude that the testimony was derived from the application of a
reliable methodology or principle in the particular case.
Id.
188
In United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877, 881-82 (D.N.M. 1995), the court
wrote: “It is not entirely clear whether Daubert requires as a prerequisite to
admissibility that the proponent establish the validity of the specific application of a
scientific technique.” Id. at 880-81. The court continued:
[A]fter reviewing the case law addressing this issue in the context of
other forensic laboratory techniques and after careful consideration of
the testimony presented at the hearing regarding the polygraph
technique, the Court holds that in the context of polygraph evidence,
such scrutiny is imperative to a faithful application of Daubert.
Id. at 882. The court went on to rule “that in addition to establishing the scientific
validity of the polygraph technique in the abstract, the proponent of the proposed
testimony must also prove that the specific examination was conducted properly by a
competent examiner.” Id.
189
See United States v. Bruno, 333 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (chromatographic
analysis of ink). “It is widely recognized that the party offering the results of
laboratory tests must . . . vouch for its correct administration in the particular case.”
Id. at 574.
190
See 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 7, at 36 (listing cases involving
polygraph, voiceprints, as well as other types of scientific evidence that adopt this
186
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702 resolves this debate in favor of the more stringent approach.
Furthermore, the Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 702
191
specified a number of reliability factors that supplement the ones
192
One is whether the field of expertise
enumerated in Daubert.
claimed by the expert is known to reach reliable results. This
provides some “official” support for challenges to entire fields of
193
forensic science (e.g., fingerprints and hair comparisons).
position); see also State v. Lehr, 38 P.3d 1172, 1179 (Ariz. 2002) (“Finally, there needs
to be a foundational showing that correct procedures were followed in a given case.
This foundation is distinct from the Frye finding itself and, in the judge’s discretion,
may initially be provided at trial in front of the jury rather than at a separate
hearing.”).
191
See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (2000). The following factors
may be relevant under Rule 702: whether the underlying research was conducted
independently of litigation; whether the expert unjustifiably extrapolated from an
accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion; whether the expert has adequately
accounted for obvious alternative explanations; whether the expert was as careful as
she would be in her professional work outside of paid litigation; and whether the
field of expertise claimed by the expert is known to reach reliable results. Id.
192
In describing the trial judge’s screening or “gatekeeping function,” the Daubert
Court identified a number of factors. First, in evaluating reliability, a judge should
determine whether the scientific theory or technique can be and has been tested.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. Second, whether a theory or technique has been subjected
to peer review and publication is “a relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in
assessing . . . scientific validity.” Id. at 594. Third, a technique’s “known or potential
rate of error” is a pertinent factor. Id. Fourth, the “existence and maintenance of
standards controlling the technique’s operation” are other indicia of trustworthiness.
Id. Finally, “general acceptance” remains an important consideration. Id.
193
The federal amendment does not stand alone. The amended Uniform Rule
702 and several jurisdictions have codified reliability standards post-Daubert, although
it is unclear whether this will result in more stringent standards. See, e.g., HAW. R.
EVID. 702 (“In determining the issue of assistance to the trier of fact, the court may
consider the trustworthiness and validity of the scientific technique or mode of
analysis employed by the proffered expert.”); IND. R. EVID. 702(b) (“Expert scientific
testimony is admissible only if the court is satisfied that the scientific principles upon
which the expert testimony rests are reliable.”). The Ohio evidence rule provides:
To the extent that the testimony reports the result of a procedure, test,
or experiment, the testimony is reliable only if all the following apply:
(1) the theory upon which the procedure, test, or experiment is based
is objectively verifiable or is validly derived from widely accepted
knowledge, facts, or principles; (2) the design of the procedure, test, or
experiment reliably implements the theory; and (3) the particular
procedure, test, or experiment was conducted in a way that will yield an
accurate result.
OHIO R. EVID. 702(C). The Supreme Court of Tennessee, in State v. Coley, 32 S.W.3d
831 (Tenn. 2000), announced:
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 702 is more stringent than its federal
counterpart. As a matter of contrast, while Fed. R. Evid. 702 requires
only that the evidence “assist the trier of fact,” Tenn. R. Evid. 702
requires that expert testimony “substantially assist the trier of fact. . . .”
This distinction indicates that the probative force of the testimony
must be stronger before it is admitted in Tennessee.
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V. OTHER INFLUENTIAL FACTORS
Daubert is only a part of the picture, however. There are at least
two other formative influences that should be considered.
A. DNA Evidence
The advent of DNA evidence has also shaped the course of
194
forensic science in significant ways. The DNA admissibility “wars”
195
196
highlighted the need for valid protocols and proficiency testing,
and commentators soon began asking why such procedures were not
197
applied in other forensic fields.
More importantly, the research scientists who testified as experts
in the DNA cases (for both the prosecution and defense) came from
a “scientific” culture, unlike the many forensic examiners who work
in crime laboratories and are sometimes described as “cops in lab
coats.” The DNA scientists were comfortable with quality control
procedures, demanded written protocols, viewed proficiency testing
as a positive development, and believed in open science and “not trial
198
by ambush.” All this was new to forensic science, which had grown
Id. at 834 (citations omitted). The Michigan rule predated Daubert. See MICH. R.
EVID. 702 (allowing expert testimony only if based on “recognized” scientific,
technical, or other knowledge).
194
See William C. Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibility of New Genetic Identification
Tests: Lessons From the “DNA War”, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22 (1993).
195
Eric S. Lander & Bruce Budowle, DNA Fingerprinting Dispute Laid to Rest, 371
NATURE 735, 735 (Oct. 27, 1994). Lander and Budowle pointed out:
The initial outcry over DNA typing standards concerned laboratory
problems: poorly defined rules for declaring a match; experiments
without controls; contaminated probes and samples; and sloppy
interpretation of autoradiograms. Although there is no evidence that
these technical failings resulted in any wrongful convictions, the lack of
standards seemed to be a recipe for trouble.
Id.
196
DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 83, at 55(“No laboratory should let its results
with a new DNA typing method be used in court, unless it has undergone such
proficiency testing via blind trials.”).
197
See Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, What DNA “Fingerprinting” Can Teach
the Law About the Rest of Forensic Science, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 361, 372 (1991). After
reviewing DNA evidence, Saks and Koehler concluded that:
[F]orensic scientists, like scientist in all other fields, should subject
their claims to methodologically rigorous empirical tests. The results
of these tests should be published and debated. Until such steps are
taken, the strong claims of forensic scientist must be regarded with far
more caution than they traditionally have been.
Id.
198
See United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1969) (“[The] course of the
government smacks too much of a trial by ambush, in violation of the spirit of the
[discovery] rules. A new trial is required, with a fair opportunity for the defense to
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199

to maturity in an adversarial environment.
The spillover effect of
DNA profiling on forensic science has been substantial.
B. Scientific Abuse Cases
DNA technology had another unexpected fallout. It exonerated
the wrongfully convicted, and in the process, the causes of these
convictions were brought into the sunlight. In their book, Actual
Innocence, Barry Scheck, Peter Neufeld, and Jim Dwyer examined
sixty-two DNA exonerations secured through Cardozo Law School’s
Innocence Project to ascertain what factors contributed to these
miscarriages of justice; one of the more startling conclusions was that
200
a third of these cases involved “tainted or fraudulent science.” This
201
Fred Zain was the
reinforced prior disclosures of expert abuse.
202
203
most notorious, but he was not alone; cases in Oklahoma City and
204
Montana are currently under investigation.
run its own neutron activation tests of the material . . . .”).
199
See Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for Regulation, 4 HARV. J. L. &
TECH. 109 (1991). “Forensic scientists present opinions and conclusions without
research. They fail to test the accuracy and reliability of their work until questions
are raised by others . . . .” Id. at 148. “All available information indicates that
forensic science laboratories perform poorly. . . . Current regulation of clinical labs
indicates that a regulatory system can improve crime laboratories.” Id. at 191.
200
SCHECK ET AL., supra note 21, at 246.
201
See Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need
for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POLICY & L. 439 (1997); see also David
Bernstein, Junk Science in the United States and the Commonwealth, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 123
(1996) (discussing cases in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and England).
202
Zain was Chief Serologist for ten years in West Virginia. In reviewing a judicial
report on Zain’s misconduct, the West Virginia Supreme Court spoke of “shocking
and egregious violations,” “corruption of our legal system,” and “mock[ing] the ideal
of justice under law.” The report by the judge states:
The acts of misconduct on the part of Zain included (1) overstating the
strength of results; (2) overstating the frequency of genetic matches on
individual pieces of evidence; (3) misreporting the frequency of
genetic matches on multiple pieces of evidence; (4) reporting that
multiple items of evidence had been tested, when only a single item
had been tested; (5) reporting inconclusive results as conclusive; (6)
repeatedly altering laboratory records; (7) grouping results to create
the erroneous impression that genetic markers had been obtained
from all samples tested; (8) failing to report conflicting results; (9)
failing to conduct or to report conducting additional testing to resolve
conflicting results; (10) implying a match with a suspect when testing
supported only a match with the victim; and (11) reporting
scientifically impossible or improbable results.
In re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d
501, 503 (W. Va. 1993) (quoting report).
203
Jim Yardley, Oklahoma Inquiry Focuses on Scientist Used by Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES,
May 2, 2001, at A1.
204
See Adam Liptak, 2 States to Review Lab Work of Expert Who Erred on ID, N.Y.
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The Inspector General’s 1997 report on the FBI laboratory
205
demonstrated the extent of the problem. This investigation found
inaccurate testimony, testimony beyond the competence of
examiners, insufficient documentation of test results, scientifically
flawed reports, inadequate record management and retention, and
failures of management to resolve serious and credible allegation of
incompetence. The report’s recommendations are revealing because
they are so basic. They include: (1) seeking accreditation of the FBI
laboratory by the American Society of Crime Laboratory
Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board; (2) requiring examiners
in the Explosives Unit to have scientific backgrounds in chemistry,
metallurgy, or engineering; (3) mandating the preparation and
signing of separate reports instead of having one composite report
“without attribution to individual examiners”; (4) establishing report
review procedures by unit chiefs; (5) preparing adequate case files to
support reports; (6) monitoring court testimony in order to preclude
examiners from testifying to matters beyond their expertise or in ways
that are “unprofessional”; and (7) developing written protocols for
scientific procedures.
These disclosures have had an impact. By 2001, the Florida
Supreme Court felt compelled to note:
In order to preserve the integrity of the criminal justice system in
Florida, particularly in the face of rising nationwide criticism of
forensic evidence in general, our state courts—both trial and
appellate—must apply the Frye test in a prudent manner to cull
scientific fiction and junk science from fact. Any doubt as to
admissibility under Frye should be resolved in a manner that
minimizes the chance of a wrongful conviction, especially in a
206
capital case.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Daubert has irrevocably altered the paradigm for the admissibility
of expert testimony. While there have been several reforms, much
remains to be done. First, basic scientific research is needed. Many
forensic techniques gained judicial acceptance before demanding
standards were required. Only the federal government—the FBI and
National Institute of Justice—have the resources to fund this
research. The actual research, however, needs to be done outside

TIMES, Dec. 19, 2002, at A24 (discussing hair evidence in the trial of Jimmy Ray
Bromgard, who spent 15 years in prison before being exonerated by DNA).
205
FBI LABORATORY, supra note 87.
206
Ramirez v. State, 810 So. 2d 836, 853 (Fla. 2001) (citations omitted).
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207

forensic science.
It should be done by independent organizations
208
such as the National Academy of Sciences, which has conducted
209
210
211
studies on voiceprints, DNA, polygraph, and comparative bullet
212
lead analysis.
The need for independent review is illustrated by the DNA
experience. In November 1991, Professor Seymour Geisser, a
statistician at the University of Minnesota, submitted a critical paper
207

See REDMAYNE, supra note 1, at 25. Redmayne noted the limitations of
publishing in forensic journals:
Details of [a] new technique might be published, but this will be in a
limited range of journals—Science and Justice, Journal of the Forensic
Sciences, Forensic Science International—that probably does not get read
much outside the forensic science community. Publication here
obviously counts for something, but it is usually only when a technique
becomes controversial that the wider scientific community—including,
sometimes, those best placed to judge its validity—will take an interest
in it.
Id; see also United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
Starzecpyzel made a similar observation:
The next Daubert factor is peer review and publication. FDEs publish in
several journals, including the Journal of Forensic Sciences, the
International Journal of Forensic Sciences, and the International
Journal of Forensic Document Examiners. Only a handful of articles in
these journals were brought to the Court’s attention that speak to
issues of the reliability of forensic document examination.
In
scrutinizing these articles, the Court found them to be significantly
different from scholarly articles in such fields as medicine or physics, in
their lack of critical scholarship.
Id; see also United States v. Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1103 (D. Alaska 2001). In
Saelee, the court explained that an:
[Expert] offered a four-page list of published and unpublished articles
dealing with handwriting analysis. According to Mr. Cawley, these
articles are written by forensic document examiners, and the published
articles are presented at professional meetings for peer review.
However, Mr. Cawley also testified that he did not know whether any of
the articles discussed error rates, empirical testing, or coincidental
matches, although he claimed to have read the articles. The list,
without analysis of the substance of the articles, is of little use to the
court. The court infers that most of the listed articles were written by
proponents of the guild style (apprentice training) process of training
handwriting examiners.
Id.
208
See 36 U.S.C.A. § 150303 (2001) (“On request of the United States
Government, [the Academy] shall . . . investigate, examine, experiment, and report
upon any subject of science or art . . . .”).
209
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF VOICE
IDENTIFICATION (1979).
210
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE (1996);
DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 83.
211
See POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION, supra note 129.
212
This report is scheduled for release in the fall of 2003.
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on the forensic use of DNA statistics to the American Journal of Human
Genetics. The Journal asked Professor Geisser to obtain permission
from the FBI to use their original data rather than the data submitted
by the FBI to defense attorneys. Geisser then requested permission
from Dr. Budowle, the FBI’s top DNA scientist. James Kearney, head
of the Forensic Science Research at the FBI, informed Geisser that
(1) the FBI had made commitments earlier to other scientists
(Chakraborty, Devlin, Risch, and Weir) and his study must not
conflict with their studies, (2) the FBI data may be used only in a
joint collaboration with Dr. Budowle, (3) the use of the data was
restricted to this one paper, and (4) all authors must agree to the
entire contents of a final manuscript prior to submission to a journal.
Geisser believed that:
an independent study under such provisions would be totally
compromised, if not impossible. . . . By the way, Chakraborty,
Devlin, Risch and Weir have all published articles based on the
FBI databases without Budowle as a co-author. Recently, I
analyzed Cellmark databases for a court in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
At the insistence of Cellmark, the prosecutor requested that the
judge rule that I not be allowed to submit my analysis of their data
213
for publication. So much for open science!

Second, the improvement of expert testimony in criminal cases
214
215
depends on better crime laboratories. They should be regulated
216
217
as in New York and Oklahoma.
Labs need to be subjected to a
rigorous accreditation process; the American Society of Crime
218
Individual
Laboratory Directors’ program is a good start.
examiners need to undergo certification, a process that should
213

Am. Ass’n for the Advancement of Sci., Committee on Scientific Freedom &
Responsibility, 5 PROFESSIONAL ETHICS REPORT 2 (1992).
214
See Nick Madigan, Houston’s Troubled DNA Crime Lab Faces Growing Scrutiny, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2003, at A20 (reporting that operations were suspended in December
2002 after an audit found numerous problems).
215
See Eric Lander, DNA Fingerprinting On Trial, 339 NATURE 501, 505 (1989) (“At
present, forensic science is virtually unregulated – with the paradoxical result that
clinical laboratories must meet higher standards to be allowed to diagnose strep
throat than forensic labs must meet to put a defendant on death row.”).
216
N.Y. EXEC. § 995-b (McKinney 2003).
217
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 150.37.
218
See Smith v. State, 702 N.E.2d 668, 673 (Ind. 1998) (DNA). The Smith court
acknowledged the importance of accreditation:
[T]he lab was accredited by the American Society of Crime Lab
Directors in 1990. Furthermore, the lab runs its tests under controlled
conditions, follows specific protocols, and conducts quality testing on
the kits and the analysts. Any concerns in this respect go to the weight
of the evidence, not its admissibility.
Id; see also Commonwealth v. Rosier, 685 N.E.2d 739, 743 n.9 (Mass. 1997) (DNA).
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219

include credible proficiency testing, continuing education, and recertification. Finally, standardization of laboratory procedures,
220
including written protocols are needed. All this requires money in
221
an area where the underfunding of crime labs is chronic.
VII. CONCLUSION
Daubert has evolved into a stringent standard in civil cases.
Paradoxically, and perhaps shamefully, this standard has not been
consistently imposed in criminal cases. Moreover, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly missed opportunities to require more exacting
standards in the use of scientific evidence in criminal prosecutions. If
the government is not willing to do the necessary validation research,

219

In fingerprint cases, a British fingerprint examiner with twenty-five years
experience at New Scotland Yard testified that the FBI proficiency tests were nearly
fraudulent: “It’s not testing their ability. It doesn’t test their expertise. I mean I’ve
set these tests to trainees and advanced technicians. And if I gave my experts these
tests, they’d fall about laughing.” United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549,
558 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
220
See State v. Jones, 541 S.E.2d 813 (S.C. 2001). In Jones, the South Carolina
Supreme Court observed that:
Kennedy has compared the insole impressions made in some 200
Canadian army boots with the feet of the wearers. He began research
in the area in 1989 after earlier work done by Dr. Louise Robbins was
discredited. Kennedy testified that different researchers use different
methods in making these type comparisons, but that he felt his method
(the one used by Agent Derrick) was the best. . . . Here, there was no
written protocol in existence when Agent Derrick conducted his
testing, much less one which had been subjected to SLED’s quality
control policies
Id. at 818, 819; see also United States v. Bahena, 223 F.3d 797, 809, 810 (8th Cir. 2000)
(voicegram analysis rejected). The Eighth Circuit noted that:
[The expert] conceded that the method he used was not in accordance
with the standards of the International Association for Identification.
It is true, as defendant points out, that there are other organizations in
the field, with other standards, but Mr. De Vir did not testify that the
methods he used conformed to any recognized standards.
Id.
221
In 1967, President Johnson’s Crime Commission noted that “the great majority
of police department laboratories have only minimal equipment and lack highly
skilled personnel able to use the modern equipment now being developed.”
PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 235 (1967). In 1974, President Nixon’s Crime
Commission commented: “Too many police crime laboratories have been set upon
budgets that preclude the recruitment of qualified, professional personnel.” NAT’L
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, POLICE 304 (1974).
A report on Washington State crime labs revealed that a “staggering backlog of cases
hinders investigations of murder, rape, arson, and other major crimes.” Tomas
Fuillen & Eric Nalder, Overwhelming Evidence: Crime Labs in Crisis, SEATTLE TIMES, Jun.
19, 1994, at A1, A14.

1112

Vol. 33:1071

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW
222

exclusion of evidence may be the only option.
Citing the “best
223
evidence” principle, a British commentator has asserted:
[W]hen expert evidence is excluded owing to reliability concerns,
the proponent may be able to improve the quality of the evidence
in the future. This is most obvious when the proponent is the
state, which is in a good position to carry out further research on
224
a technique or theory.

222

See United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 272 (4th Cir. 2003) (Michael, J.,
dissenting) (“The government has had ten years to comply with Daubert. It should
not be given a pass in this case.”).
223
Professor Nance has argued against the conventional wisdom that posited jury
control as the underlying rationale for evidentiary rules, a position put forth by
Thayer and endorsed by McCormick. Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73
IOWA L. REV. 227 (1988). Nance claimed that litigant control was a better
explanatory theory—that is, the exclusion of some types of evidence is intended to
require litigants to produce “better evidence.”
224
REDMAYNE, supra note 1, at 126.

